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  631 
THE SECRET LIFE OF PRIORITY: CORPORATE 
REORGANIZATION AFTER JEVIC 
Jonathan C. Lipson* 
Abstract: Academics have long debated whether the order of bankruptcy distributions 
should be “absolute” or “relative.” Should courts have the flexibility to scramble priority to 
serve some greater good? The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding 
Corp. holds that the answer is “no”: priority is absolute absent the consent of affected 
creditors. 
“Consent” is not self-defining, however, and is largely ignored in debates about priority. 
This is a problem because consent is hard to pinpoint in corporate reorganizations, a type of 
aggregate proceeding that can involve hundreds or thousands of creditors and shareholders. 
Although the Jevic majority does not define consent, its reasoning reflects a Court concerned 
about process values that proxy for it: stakeholder participation, outcome predictability, and 
procedural integrity. Jevic thus reveals a secret: “priority” is not only about the order in 
which a corporate debtor pays its creditors, but also about the process by which it does so. 
I make three main points. First, I explain why “consent” is indeterminate in this context, 
inviting inspection of process quality. Second, I assess Jevic’s process-value framework. 
Implementing these values is not costless, so the Court’s commitment to them suggests that 
efficiency—the mantra of many scholars—is not the only or necessarily the most important 
value in reorganization. Third, I argue that these values conflict with the power that senior 
secured creditors have gained in recent years to control corporate reorganizations. Many 
worry that this power produces needless expropriation and error. I conclude by sketching 
opportunities that Jevic creates for scholars and practitioners who share these concerns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding 
Corp.1 is viewed as its most important opinion on corporate 
reorganization in at least a generation2—but often for the wrong reason. 
Many view the opinion as being about “priority,” the order in which a 
corporate debtor’s assets are distributed when it completes the 
bankruptcy process.3 Facially, this is correct: Justice Breyer, writing for 
a 6-2 majority, held that final distributions in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
must follow the “ordinary” and “basic” priority rules of the Bankruptcy 
Code absent “the affected creditors’ consent.”4 
At a deeper level, however, Jevic is about process, and the values that 
should inform corporate reorganization practice. Here, the priority rules 
were in doubt only because the lower courts had approved a so-called 
                                                     
1. 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 979 (2017). 
2. See Ralph Brubaker, Taking Bankruptcy’s Distribution Rules Seriously: How the Supreme 
Court Saved Bankruptcy from Self-Destruction, BANKR. L. LETTER, Apr. 2017, at 1 (“[T]he 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. has the potential to be one of 
the most consequential events for bankruptcy reorganization law and practice since the famous 1913 
absolute-priority decision in Northern Pacific Railway v. Boyd.” (footnote omitted)). 
3. See, e.g., Hollace T. Cohen, Is the Absolute Priority Rule Alive and Well? Jevic Threatens the 
Rule and Other Core Bankruptcy Principles, 26 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 45, 46 (2017) 
(writing prior to Supreme Court ruling that “[i]f Jevic is reversed, it will likely bar any deviation 
from the absolute priority rule in the context of a pre-plan settlement and may provide guidance 
with respect to deviation from other core bankruptcy principles in pre-plan settlements, whether the 
debtor is solvent or insolvent. If, however, Jevic is affirmed, it will allow a deviation from the 
absolute priority rule if the debtor is insolvent, without being faced with the question whether a 
deviation from that rule or any other core principle is permissible if the debtor is solvent”); Nicholas 
L. Georgakopoulos, Through Jevic’s Mirror: Orders, Fees, and Settlements, 72 BUS. LAW. 917, 
935–36 (2017) (arguing that “the most pronounced consequence of Jevic” will be its effect on the 
priority of payments pursuant to so-called “first-day” orders in Chapter 11 cases); Bruce Grohsgal, 
How Absolute Is the Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy? The Case for Structured Dismissals, 8 
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 439, 454 (2017) (criticizing Jevic and arguing that “a bankruptcy court 
has authority under the Code to approve a settlement and structured dismissal in a Chapter 11 case 
when it is in the best interest of creditors, even if distributions among unsecured creditors are not in 
accordance with the absolute priority rule”); Anna Haugen et al., Re-“Structuring” Dismissal 
Flexibility: An Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Jevic Decision, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2017, at 
12, 72 (“Practitioners should also expect additional scrutiny of any priority-violating [transactions] 
as lower courts grapple with the bounds of Jevic, especially in the face of creditor dissent.”). 
4. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 983; see also id. at 978 (“A distribution scheme ordered in connection with 
the dismissal of a Chapter 11 case cannot, without the consent of the affected parties, deviate from 
the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the Code establishes for final 
distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies.”). Although they recognized that the Jevic 
Court “answer[ed] a novel and important question of bankruptcy law,” Justices Alito and Thomas 
nevertheless dissented because “having persuaded us to grant certiorari on one question, petitioners 
chose to argue a different question on the merits.” Id. at 987 (Thomas, J., dissenting). They would 
therefore have dismissed the petition on grounds that certiorari was improvidently granted. Id. 
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“structured dismissal,” a procedural concoction under which senior and 
junior claimants sought to split the assets of the debtor, a trucking 
company, by skipping the “mid-priority” wage claims held by the 
petitioners, the debtor’s terminated drivers.5 As used in Jevic, this 
procedural maneuver threatened the foundations of the corporate 
reorganization system, not only its priority structure, but also its process 
framework.6 
Structured dismissals have become an important vehicle for resolving 
Chapter 11 cases.7 They substitute for the two main exit paths Congress 
created out of corporate bankruptcy, a “plan of reorganization” under 
Chapter 11—a cross between a consent decree and a contract8—or a 
trustee-supervised liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.9 
Structured dismissals are attractive because they are cheaper than 
Chapter 11 plans, which require costly disclosure and creditor voting.10 
And, they are considered less risky than a Chapter 7 liquidation, where a 
trustee may impair recoveries by selling assets piece-meal and/or sue 
those who harmed the corporate debtor.11 In many cases, including Jevic, 
                                                     
5. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding 
Corp.), 787 F.3d 173, 188 (3d Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. 973. See generally Order 
Granting Joint Motion of the Debtors, CIT, Sun Capital & the Official Committee of Unsecured 
Creditors Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 349 & 1112(b) & Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019 for Entry of an 
Order: (I) Approving Settlement Agreement & Releasing Claims; (II) Dismissing the Debtors’ 
Cases Upon Implementation of Settlement; & (III) Granting Related Relief, In re Jevic Holding 
Corp., No. 08-11006 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Dismissal Order], vacated, 
Order at 1, In re Jevic Holding Corp., No. 13-104-SLR (D. Del. May 16, 2017). 
As explained further below, a portion of the drivers’ claims would be viewed as “mid-priority” 
because they were neither senior secured claims nor junior unsecured claims. Instead, they were 
entitled to a statutorily created fourth priority over general unsecured creditors. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 507(a)(4) (2012). 
6. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 986 (observing that the “consequences [of upholding the dismissal] are 
potentially serious”). 
7. Id. at 979 (“Although the Code does not expressly mention structured dismissals, they ‘appear 
to be increasingly common.’” (quoting AM. BANKR. INST, COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF 
CHAPTER 11: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 270 n.973 (2014) [hereinafter ABI 
REPORT])). 
8. See Official Creditors Comm. of Stratford of Tex., Inc. v. Stratford of Tex., Inc. (In re 
Stratford of Tex., Inc.), 635 F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 1981) (observing that reorganization plan 
“represents a kind of consent decree which has many attributes of a contract”). 
9. They are also an alternative to a “clean” or “unstructured” dismissal, where the case is simply 
dismissed without the special provisions found in structured dismissals including, as here, a 
deviation from absolute priority. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 349, 1112; discussion infra Part I (regarding 
dismissal standards and effects). 
10. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125–1126, 1129. 
11. Id. § 726; see, e.g., In re Hyatt, 509 B.R. 707, 722 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2014) (observing that 
Chapter 7 recoveries tend to be lower than those in Chapter 11). 
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the targets of those suits may be the very people who want the structured 
dismissal—those who controlled the debtor before liquidation. 
Jevic taps into a long-running debate among bankruptcy scholars: 
should priority be “absolute,” meaning that senior creditor A must be 
paid before junior creditor B, who must be paid before shareholder C, 
and so on?12 Or, may we scramble the order, permitting “relative” 
priority in the service of some greater good?13 The lower courts in Jevic 
took the latter view, believing that the greater good was closure—
resolving a case that appeared hopeless because the debtor had no assets 
to fund a plan or trustee-supervised liquidation.14 
The Jevic Court disagreed. In reversing, the majority established that 
priority is “absolute” absent consent. That is, consent trumps closure. 
But this also means that Jevic transforms the priority debate. Now, we 
                                                     
12. See, e.g., Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 123 (1991) (the “absolute priority rule has been the 
cornerstone of reorganization practice and theory”); Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking 
Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1236 
(2013) (the absolute priority rule is “quite appropriately, bankruptcy’s most important and famous 
rule”); cf. Barry E. Adler, Game-Theoretic Bankruptcy Valuation, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 214 
(2012) (“Anticipation of breaches in absolute priority can raise a firm’s ex ante cost of capital.”). A 
notable earlier contribution is Walter J. Blum, Full Priority and Full Compensation in Corporate 
Reorganizations: A Reappraisal, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 437–39 (1958) (rejecting several “relative 
priority” proposals, including maintaining the old capital structure, having an “expansible 
valuation,” and allowing the court to set a “maximum permissible capitalization”).  
13. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Priority Matters: Absolute Priority, Relative Priority, and the 
Costs of Bankruptcy, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 792 (2017) (providing examples of relative priority); 
Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 759, 765 n.2 (2011) (“The focus of Option-Preservation Priority is the relationship 
between classes of creditors and the decisions that affect the maximization of assets in Chapter 
11.”); Grohsgal, supra note 3, at 451 (“The absolute priority rule under the current Code is a special, 
limited rule. It is not a rule that operates substantively throughout the Code.”); Richard Squire, The 
Case for Symmetry in Creditors’ Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 806, 853–55 (2014) (arguing that 
“asymmetry” in priority produces opportunistic behavior). Earlier versions appear in James C. 
Bonbright & Milton M. Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in a 
Corporate Reorganization, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 127, 130 (1928) (using “relative priority” as 
shorthand for “priority of income position”). Narrower definitions of relative priority might not 
view the distributions approved by the lower courts in Jevic as “relative priority.” See, e.g., Walter 
J. Blum, The “New Directions” for Priority Rights in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 67 HARV. L. 
REV. 1367, 1368–69 (1954). But the underlying distributive mechanism and logic are the same: out-
of-the-money juniors were to be paid over seniors’ objections based on a view that this was a 
wealth-enhancing outcome.  
14. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 982 (2017) (“The 
[bankruptcy] court accordingly decided to grant the motion in light of the ‘dire circumstances’ 
facing the estate and its creditors. Specifically, the court predicted that without the settlement and 
dismissal, there was ‘no realistic prospect’ of a meaningful distribution for anyone other than the 
secured creditors. A confirmable Chapter 11 plan was unattainable. And there would be no funds to 
operate, investigate, or litigate were the case converted to a proceeding in Chapter 7.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
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know what the rule is—absolute priority in final distributions—but we 
must determine what comprises its exception, “consent.” Ordinarily, 
“consent” for these purposes is shown by an affirmative creditor vote on 
a plan of reorganization. But, the structured dismissal—which, itself, 
survives Jevic—replaces the reorganization plan and its procedural 
protections, including creditor voting. The threat to those procedural 
protections was as great a problem as—perhaps greater than—the threat 
to the absolute priority rule (APR) sanctioned by the lower courts. 
Discussions of priority rarely consider the role of consent in 
bankruptcy.15 Instead, they focus on the economic merits of the rule-
choices: does absolute or relative priority produce the greatest social 
welfare?16 The omission is embarrassing, but not surprising. Absent 
creditors’ vote on a plan, “consent” is difficult to pinpoint in corporate 
reorganization because it is a form of aggregate proceeding in which 
hundreds or thousands of creditors and shareholders assert different 
rights against a common debtor.17 Is “consent” merely the failure to 
object to some important action in the case, such as a structured 
dismissal? Or does it require something more, such as affirmative 
assent? The majority in Jevic did not say, but the risk of false negatives 
is high because it is not clear whether a failure to object would signal 
consent—or simply a misunderstanding of what was at stake. 
In theory, unsecured creditors may be represented by a committee 
and, as in Jevic, that committee may purport to consent on behalf of 
creditors. But because the same committee in Jevic technically 
represented both the settling unsecured creditors and the objecting 
drivers, the most we can say is that representative consent presents in 
bankruptcy the same ethical challenges we find in aggregate litigations, 
                                                     
15. Cf. Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 663, 686–87 (2009) (discussing “consent” generally). Literature on “consent” in 
aggregate litigation is discussed infra Part II.  
16. See, e.g., Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the 
Troubling Legacy of Chrysler and GM, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375, 1396 (arguing that absolute 
priority promotes increased distribution values). Although not framed in terms of consent, Jay 
Westbrook was among the first to recognize the procedural powers that senior creditors can assert. 
See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795, 797 
(2004) (“[C]ontrol of the bankruptcy process, rather than formal rules of security and priority, is the 
key to understanding both secured-credit and bankruptcy law: Control is the function of bankruptcy; 
priority is the end for which it is employed.”). 
17. See, e.g., Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate Litigation, 
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 991 (2012) (discussing “[t]he hotly contested issue of claimant consent in 
the resolution of aggregate litigation”).  
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generally: one agent cannot act effectively for adverse principals.18 
Worse, the statutory standards by which a court should assess structured 
dismissals are opaque, cobbled together from provisions that say nothing 
about them.19 How can a court identify consent when no one knows what 
the rules are? 
Jevic hints at some answers. Courts concerned about consent—in 
structured dismissals, and perhaps beyond—should assess the quality of 
the process that leads to important judicial action, such as case 
resolution. While Jevic does not define “consent,” the majority opinion 
reveals a Court concerned about three process values that may proxy for 
it: 
x Participation. Consent requires participation. The Chapter 11 plan 
is corporate reorganization’s main participatory mechanism, in 
particular through disclosure and voting.20 Because structured 
dismissals require neither, courts will have to decide what forms of 
“off-plan” participation permit an inference of consent. 
x Predictability. Consent is more plausible—both to reach and to 
show—if the rules around which parties settle are more predictable. 
By choosing absolute, rather than relative, priority, Jevic narrows 
the range of possible outcomes and the standards by which they 
must be assessed.21 Absolute priority increases predictability. 
x Procedural integrity. Embedded in concerns about participation and 
predictability is anxiety about procedural integrity, in particular 
threats of collusion and opportunistic litigation.22 These forms of 
misbehavior threaten the credibility of consent, and confidence in 
                                                     
18. The focus in aggregate litigation has often been on conflicts held by lawyers. See, e.g., 
Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 
317 (2011) (criticizing quasi-class action settlements because they empower lawyers and “the 
empowerment of the lawyer is not purely in service of a better deal for clients. In this setting, the 
lawyer acquires more money than any of her clients”). Legal ethics in aggregate litigation are 
discussed infra Part II. In theory, separate committees may be appointed to represent priority 
creditors, such as Jevic’s drivers, although the added cost makes that problematic. 
19. As discussed infra Part I, structured dismissals are apparently vetted by courts under, among 
others, Bankruptcy Code §§ 349, 363, 1112 and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019, none 
of which offer judges any guidance greater than “cause.” 
20. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 986 (2017) (“[P]rohibiting an 
attempt to ‘short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for confirmation of a reorganization plan by 
establishing the terms of the plan sub rosa in connection with a sale of assets.’” (quoting Pension 
Benefit Guar. Corp., Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 
F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983))). 
21. Id. at 986 (discussing unpredictability introduced by lower courts’ rationales). 
22. Id. at 986–87 (warning of “risks of collusion, i.e., senior secured creditors and general 
unsecured creditors teaming up to squeeze out priority unsecured creditors” (citing Bank of Am. 
Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 444 (1999))).  
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corporate reorganization, generally. Jevic is a reminder that 
bankruptcy judges must police the integrity of the reorganization 
process, even as they seek to maximize its payouts. 
Like many process values, these are often lauded in principle and 
disputed in practice. Implementing them may be especially problematic 
in the “unruly”23 world of corporate reorganization. They require time 
and money, which are usually scarce in this context. While earlier 
writers sometimes argued that bankruptcy should be treated as if it were 
a species of civil procedure,24 they never explained what this meant, 
offered any theory of the process values that should underlie their 
proposal, or appreciated the procedural power that priority gives senior 
creditors which is, as explained below, the bane of corporate 
reorganization practice for many today. 
The relationship between priority and process is severely 
undertheorized. Yet, that relationship threads the fabric of corporate 
reorganization. Many observers, for example, believe that senior 
creditors assert too much power over the reorganization process without 
considering the procedural leverage conferred by their seniority.25 In the 
Chrysler26 and General Motors27 bankruptcies, for example, senior 
creditors used their priority status to obtain veto rights at the beginning 
of these cases that squelched participation, exposed other stakeholders to 
senior creditors’ whims, and created the appearance of collusion.28 A 
study of early maneuvers in Jevic shows a similar pattern: senior 
creditors gained control of the reorganization process at the outset, 
rendering the problematic structured dismissal there virtually inevitable. 
                                                     
23. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 649 (2012) (noting 
the importance of clarity and predictability in light of the fact that the “Bankruptcy Code 
standardizes an expansive (and sometimes unruly) area of law”).  
24. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (Is) Civil 
Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 934 (2004); see also Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s 
Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 576–77 (1998) (observing that in the 1990s there were 
“two distinct camps. In the first are traditional bankruptcy lawyers and scholars . . . . The [second] 
group’s distinctive characteristic is its focus on procedure”). 
25. For ease of reference, I refer to senior secured creditors—whether acting as individual lenders 
or in groups—as “senior creditors.” I refer to stakeholders whose claims are not secured by 
collateral in some way—including priority unsecured creditors, such as the drivers in Jevic—as 
“junior creditors/stakeholders.” In rare cases where I discuss junior lienholders, I simply call them 
that.  
26. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police 
Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009) (mem.). 
27. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 497 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
28. See, e.g., Brubaker & Tabb, supra note 16, at 1378. See generally Mark J. Roe & David 
Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727 (2010); discussion infra section 
III.B. 
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Senior creditors are often the motivating force behind structured 
dismissals because they enable them to capture the benefits of 
bankruptcy’s preemptive power without the costs of a plan or the 
scrutiny of a trustee-supervised liquidation.29 Many worry that senior 
creditor control is the greatest threat facing the Chapter 11 system 
because it vests dominance in a single, largely unaccountable 
stakeholder.30 Concentrated, unaccountable power leads to expropriation 
and error. It conflicts with Jevic’s process values because it debilitates 
participation by other stakeholders, reduces predictability, and 
undermines procedural integrity. It also upsets the balance Congress 
sought to strike between senior and junior claimants in the Bankruptcy 
Code that was intended to promote the process values articulated in 
Jevic.31 
Although the subject matter is technical, this paper’s claim is 
straightforward: Jevic reveals that the secret life of priority is not only 
about distributive rights, but also about process values of participation, 
predictability, and procedural integrity. Senior creditor power to control 
the reorganization process can threaten these values, so participants and 
observers after Jevic should rethink the (im)balance of power in Chapter 
11. 
The paper makes three main contributions. After summarizing Jevic, 
Part II explains problems with “consent” as a decisional standard for 
resolving corporate reorganizations absent a Chapter 11 plan. Part III 
assesses Jevic’s process-oriented framework as a proxy for consent. Part 
IV shows how senior creditors can use their priority rights to 
                                                     
29. Norman L. Pernick & G. David Dean, Structured Chapter 11 Dismissals: A Viable and 
Growing Alternative After Asset Sales, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2010, at 1, 58–59 (2010) 
(discussing use of structured dismissals where a corporate debtor has “no unsecured assets to 
administer or with insufficient unsecured assets to fund a confirmable chapter 11 plan”). 
30. See, e.g., Charles J. Tabb, The Bankruptcy Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and the Limited 
Rights of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 765, 768 (“The reality then is that 
the entire reorganization is dependent on the good graces of the prebankruptcy controlling secured 
lender. That means that important stakeholders—bondholders, trade creditors, tort victims, 
employees, and shareholders, to name but a few—are excluded from any recovery but for the whims 
of the controlling secured creditor.”); Westbrook, supra note 16, at 816–26 (developing model of 
“dominant” secured creditor). 
31. The Bankruptcy Code was “designed to counteract the natural tendency of a debtor in distress 
to pacify large creditors, with whom the debtor would expect to do business, at the expense of small 
and scattered public investors.” S. REP. No. 95-989, at 10 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5796; see also Juliet M. Moringiello, When Does Some Federal Interest 
Require a Different Result?: An Essay on the Use and Misuse of Butner v. United States, 2015 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 657, 658–59 (“[B]y giving secured creditors excessive control over business 
reorganizations, Chapter 11 no longer effectively balances its two primary goals, the effective 
reorganization of businesses and the maximization of asset values for all creditors.”). 
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commandeer Chapter 11 cases, setting up a tension with Jevic’s process 
values. I close by briefly sketching opportunities for scholars and 
practitioners created by Jevic. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Jevic Bankruptcy 
Jevic Transportation Corporation (with affiliated debtors, “Jevic”) 
was a New Jersey trucking company that began operations in 1981.32 In 
2006, Sun Capital Partners (Sun), a private equity firm, acquired Jevic 
with money borrowed from CIT Group (CIT) in a “leveraged buyout” 
(LBO).33 In 2008, unable to service the LBO debt, Jevic went into 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.34 At the time of filing, it owed $53 million to 
senior secured creditors Sun and CIT, and over $20 million to tax and 
general unsecured creditors.35 It had about 1,700 employees, most of 
whom it laid off shortly before bankruptcy.36 
1. The Bankruptcy Litigations 
There were two main litigations during Jevic’s bankruptcy. First, 
petitioners, a group of former Jevic truck drivers, sued both Jevic and 
                                                     
32. See Emergency Motion for Interim & Final Orders (I) Authorizing Debtors-In-Possession to 
Enter into Senior Debtor-in-Possession Credit Agreement & Obtain Postpetition Financing Pursuant 
to Sections 363 & 364 of the Bankruptcy Code; (II) Granting Liens, Security Interests & 
Superpriority Claims; (III) Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral; (IV) Affording Adequate 
Protection to Prepetition Lenders; & (V) Providing for the Payment of Secured Prepetition 
Indebtedness ¶ 8, In re Jevic Holding Corp., No. 08-11006 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. May 20, 2008) 
[hereinafter DIP Motion].  
33. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 980 (2017). In a leveraged 
buyout: 
[A]n acquirer may form a wholly owned subsidiary to buy the stock of the debtor (D) from D’s 
pre-acquisition shareholders. The acquirer finances the acquisition by borrowing a significant 
portion of the purchase price, liability which it causes D to assume after closing, secured by 
D’s assets. The (borrowed) purchase price is then remitted to D’s pre-acquisition shareholders. 
This has the effect of giving D’s selling shareholders the benefit of using D’s assets to gain 
priority over D’s pre-bankruptcy unsecured creditors, who will be junior in right to LBO 
lenders with liens encumbering D’s assets. 
Jonathan C. Lipson & Jennifer L. Vandermeuse, Stern, Seriously: The Article I Judicial Power, 
Fraudulent Transfers, and Leveraged Buyouts, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 1161, 1220. 
34. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 980 (“Just two years after Sun’s buyout, Jevic . . . filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy.”). 
35. Id. 
36. Czyzewski v. Jevic Transp., Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), 496 B.R. 151, 154–55 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2013). 
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Sun claiming that they had violated state and federal Worker Adjustment 
and Retraining Notification (WARN) Acts, which require a company to 
give workers at least sixty days’ notice before their termination (the 
“WARN suit”).37 The drivers won summary judgment against Jevic, but 
not against Sun, leaving a $12.4 million wage claim against the debtor, 
of which about $8.3 million was entitled to be paid before any 
distributions could be made to general unsecured creditors.38 “[T]his,” 
the Supreme Court majority observed emphatically, was “the point to 
remember.”39 
Second, the Bankruptcy Court authorized the committee representing 
Jevic’s unsecured creditors (“creditors’ committee” or “committee”) to 
sue Sun and CIT for harm allegedly caused by the LBO (the “LBO 
suit”).40 Any recoveries from such a suit would belong to the bankruptcy 
estate.41 The committee alleged that by virtue of the LBO, Sun and CIT 
had “hastened Jevic’s bankruptcy by saddling it with debts that it 
couldn’t service.”42 In 2011, the Bankruptcy Court held that the 
committee’s claims survived a motion to dismiss.43 
2. The Structured Dismissal 
While the WARN suit proceeded, Sun, CIT, Jevic, and the creditors’ 
committee negotiated a settlement of the LBO suit. The settlement 
provided the following: 
 
x The Bankruptcy Court would dismiss the LBO suit with prejudice; 
                                                     
37. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 980 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:21-2 (West 
2011)). 
38. Id. (citing In re Jevic Holding Corp., 496 B.R. 151). 
39. Id. Eventually Sun prevailed on the ground that Sun was not the workers’ employer at the 
relevant times. See generally In re Jevic Holding Corp., 656 F. App’x 617 (3d Cir. 2016). 
Specifically, $8.3 million of the drivers’ claims were entitled to fourth priority in distributions as 
unpaid wage claims. See Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 980. 
40.  Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 981. 
41. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), (6) (2012); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of 
Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 552–53 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that a 
creditor’s committee can bring a derivative action on behalf of the estate)). 
42. Id. (quoting Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic 
Holding Corp.), 787 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2015)). 
43. Id. (citing Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic 
Holding Corp.), No. 08-11006 (BLS), 2011 WL 4345204 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 15, 2011)). 
Specifically, the committee had adequately pleaded claims of preferential transfer under Bankruptcy 
Code section 547 and of fraudulent transfer under section 548. Id. 
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x CIT would pay $2 million in legal fees of the committee’s counsel; 
and 
x Sun would assign its lien on Jevic’s remaining $1.7 million to a 
trust to pay taxes and administrative expenses.44 
 
The estate would distribute the remainder on a pro rata basis to the 
low-priority general unsecured creditors,45 “but . . . would not distribute 
anything to petitioners (who, by virtue of their WARN judgment, held 
an $8.3 million mid-level-priority wage claim against the estate).”46 
Thereafter, the bankruptcy case would be dismissed, leaving all earlier 
court orders in effect.47 
As a practical matter, these elements, known collectively as a 
“structured dismissal,” had two key consequences. First, the distribution 
would skip the “mid-priority” claims of the drivers, even though there 
was no dispute about the drivers’ entitlement to them. Second, the 
dismissal would free Sun and CIT from liability for the failed LBO they 
had orchestrated, which apparently led to the company’s demise. Despite 
dismissing the bankruptcy, the truck drivers would be enjoined from 
suing Sun and CIT in state court for causes of action created by New 
Jersey’s fraudulent transfer law.48 In other words, the structured 
                                                     
44. Id. 
45. Although Sun was principally Jevic’s shareholder, it had acquired a lien on about $2 million 
of Jevic’s assets by subrogation to CIT’s rights when it (Sun) paid a portion of the CIT secured loan. 
See Joint Motion of the Debtors, CIT, Sun Capital & the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors 
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 349 & 1112(b) & Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019 for Entry of an Order: (I) 
Approving Settlement Agreement & Releasing Claims; (II) Dismissing the Debtors’ Cases Upon 
Implementation of Settlement; & (III) Granting Related Relief Filed ¶ 7, In re Jevic Holding Corp., 
No. 08-11006 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. June 27, 2012) [hereinafter Dismissal Motion]. 
46. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 981. Apparently, Sun insisted on skipping the petitioners’ priority wage 
claims because Sun did not want to fund litigation “against itself.” Id. (“Sun’s counsel 
acknowledging before the Bankruptcy Court that ‘Sun probably does care where the money goes 
because you can take judicial notice that there’s a pending WARN action against Sun by the WARN 
plaintiffs. And if the money goes to the WARN plaintiffs, then you’re funding someone who is 
suing you who otherwise doesn’t have funds and is doing it on a contingent fee basis.’” (quoting In 
re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 177–78 n.4)). 
47. Id. 
48. As discussed below, section 349 of the Bankruptcy Code governs the effect of dismissals. It 
provides, in pertinent part, that “[u]nless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of a 
case . . . (3) revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such property was vested 
immediately before the commencement of the case under this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 349(b) (2012). This 
means that dismissal should “undo the bankruptcy case, as far as practicable.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-
595, at 338 (1977). In Jevic, the Settlement Agreement released Sun and CIT from “third party 
actions or proceedings relating in any way to, or arising from any transaction with or in connection 
to, the Debtors or their estates of whatever kind or nature . . . including, without limitation, any and 
all claims asserted in or which could have been asserted in, or which related to the subject matter of 
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dismissal in Jevic would have both stripped the drivers of their priority 
claims in bankruptcy and forbidden them from pursuing any other 
remedies against those who allegedly harmed them outside of 
bankruptcy. 
3. The Problem as Framed—Priority Skipping 
The drivers objected, arguing that the structured dismissal “violated 
the [Bankruptcy] Code’s priority scheme because it skipped 
petitioners—who, by virtue of their WARN judgment, had mid-level-
priority claims against estate assets—and distributed estate money to 
low-priority general unsecured creditors.”49 
The Bankruptcy Court acknowledged this problem, but approved the 
structured dismissal anyway due to “the ‘dire circumstances’” facing the 
estate and its creditors.50 Jevic had borrowed more money from CIT 
during the case, secured on a “super-priority” basis by its assets, so that 
it apparently had no unencumbered assets.51 It was, in the vernacular, 
“administratively insolvent,” meaning that it could not pay first-priority 
expenses of administering the estate, much less any other “mid-priority” 
creditors, such as the drivers. The Bankruptcy Court “predicted that 
without the settlement and dismissal, there was ‘no realistic prospect’ of 
a meaningful distribution for anyone other than the secured creditors,” 
CIT and Sun.52 Thus, “[a] confirmable Chapter 11 plan was unattainable. 
And there would be no funds to operate, investigate, or litigate were the 
case converted to a [liquidation] proceeding in Chapter 7.”53 
The drivers appealed the order approving the structured dismissal to 
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.54 Although 
the district judge also recognized that the distributions under the 
structured settlement violated the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, 
                                                     
the Adversary Proceeding . . . .” Exhibit A to Joint Motion: Settlement Agreement ¶ 2(c)(i), In re 
Jevic Holding Corp., No. 08-11006 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. June 27, 2012). Among other things, this 
would have enjoined the drivers from suing under New Jersey’s fraudulent transfer act. See N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 25:2-20 (West 2015). 
49. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 981. 
50. Id. at 982 (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 57a, Jevic, 137 S. Ct. 973 (No. 15-649)). 
51. This financing, and the power that it gave CIT over the process, are discussed in detail infra 
section III.B.1. 
52. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 982 (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 50, at 58a). 
53. Id. 
54. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), No. 08-11006(BLS), 2014 WL 
268613 (D. Del. Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Czyzewski v. 
Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017). 
05 - Lipson(2).docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018 9:21 PM 
644 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:631 
 
she nevertheless approved the settlement because, she reasoned, the 
Bankruptcy Code’s priority rules were “not a bar to the approval of the 
settlement as [the settlement] is not a reorganization plan.”55 
A divided Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District 
Court.56 The majority held that structured dismissals need not always 
respect priority.57 Congress, the appellate court explained, had only 
“codified the absolute priority rule . . . in the specific context of plan 
confirmation.”58 As a result, the court reasoned, bankruptcy courts could, 
“in rare instances like this one, approve structured dismissals that do not 
strictly adhere to the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.”59  
Judge Scirica concurred in part, but also dissented for three reasons. 
First, he questioned whether the proposed distributions were, in fact, 
wealth-maximizing, as the proponents had claimed.60 Rather, he noted, 
the priority-skipping distribution “deviates from the Code’s priority 
scheme so as to maximize the recovery that certain creditors receive,” at 
the expense of higher priority creditors (the drivers).61 Second, 
anticipating Justice Breyer’s concerns about process quality, he worried 
that the structured dismissal here was a substitute for a plan without the 
procedural protections of a plan.62 Third, he noted, the secured creditors 
here should have had no power to make a “gift” to junior unsecured 
creditors, as they had sought, because the settlement proceeds were 
property of the estate—not property of CIT or Sun to give as they 
wished.63 
                                                     
55. Id. at *3. This was an especially odd finding, as the exit path most likely to permit deviations 
of this sort would have been a plan, which permits greater flexibility in altering priorities than a 
Chapter 7 liquidation. 
56. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding 
Corp.), 787 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 
U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017); id. at 186 (Scirica, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
57. Id. at 183–84 (majority opinion). 
58. Id. at 183. 
59. Id. at 180. 
60. Id. at 187 (Scirica, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
61. Id.  
62. Id. at 188 (“Although the combination of the settlement and structured dismissal here does 
not, strictly speaking, constitute a sub rosa plan—the hallmark of such a plan is that it dictates the 
terms of a reorganization plan, and the settlement here does not do so—the broader concerns 
underlying the sub rosa doctrine are at play.”). 
63. Id. (“Critical to this analysis is the fact that the money paid by the secured creditors in the 
settlement was property of the estate. A cause of action held by the debtor is property of the 
estate.”). 
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4. Jevic in the Supreme Court—Priority in Final Distributions 
Before the Supreme Court, the “basic question” was, “[c]an a 
bankruptcy court approve a structured dismissal that provides for 
distributions that do not follow ordinary priority rules without the 
affected creditors’ consent?”64 The Court’s “simple answer to this 
complicated question” was “‘no.’”65 
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion opened with the sweeping claim 
that “[t]he [Bankruptcy] Code’s priority system constitutes a basic 
underpinning of business bankruptcy law.”66 This priority system applies 
in either of the two major exit paths envisioned by Congress: a 
reorganization plan under Chapter 11 or a liquidation supervised by a 
trustee under Chapter 7.67 The structured dismissal devised by the 
settling parties in Jevic was simply an end-run around this system; the 
Court would not tolerate it. 
The Bankruptcy Code recognizes three sets of “ordinary” priority 
rules: (1) those provided by state law, with respect to secured claims, 
which confer priority rights (liens) in a debtor’s property, such as those 
held by CIT on Jevic’s assets;68 (2) statutory priority rights under 
Bankruptcy Code section 507, such as the one giving the drivers’ wage 
claims fourth (“mid”) priority as unsecured claims;69 and (3) the 
common law “absolute priority rule,” which applies to plans of 
reorganization and (now we know) structured dismissals, and more 
generally contemplates that creditors have priority over owners (e.g., 
shareholders).70 
The Court observed that these priority rules—in particular, the 
APR—have “long been considered fundamental to the Bankruptcy 
Code’s operation” because, among other reasons, they “enforce a 
distribution of the debtor’s assets in an orderly manner . . . in accordance 
                                                     
64. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. (“Distributions of estate assets at the termination of a business bankruptcy normally take 
place through a Chapter 7 liquidation or a Chapter 11 plan, and both are governed by priority. In 
Chapter 7 liquidations, priority is an absolute command—lower priority creditors cannot receive 
anything until higher priority creditors have been paid in full.” (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 725–726 
(2012))). 
68. For example, under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which governs security 
interests in personal property and has been enacted in all fifty states. 
69. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a). 
70. Id. § 1129(b). The Bankruptcy Code also recognizes contractual subordination, which is the 
creation of priority by agreement. Id. § 510(a). 
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with established principles rather than on the basis of the inside 
influence or economic leverage of a particular creditor.”71 Thus, the 
Court noted, the APR is “quite appropriately, bankruptcy’s most 
important and famous rule”72 and is “the cornerstone of reorganization 
practice and theory.”73 
This was important, for it showed that the majority understood that 
plans and liquidations were the two main routes out of bankruptcy, and 
that a kind of “absolute” priority structure applied in either case. If 
Congress had intended to permit non-consensual deviations—a third 
way out, such as the Jevic structured dismissal—it would have said so. 
“[W]e would expect to see some affirmative indication of intent if 
Congress actually meant to make structured dismissals a backdoor 
means to achieve the exact kind of nonconsensual priority-violating final 
distributions that the Code prohibits in Chapter 7 liquidations and 
Chapter 11 plans.”74 Because Congress does not “hide elephants in 
mouseholes,”75 the majority concluded that the priority rules that applied 
in a Chapter 11 plan or a Chapter 7 liquidation should also apply in a 
structured dismissal.76 
B. Problems with Structured Dismissals—“Cause” and Effects 
Although Jevic’s holding focused on the priority rules that apply in 
final distributions of estate property, it was driven by the particular 
mechanism used to resolve the case, a “structured dismissal,” a 
procedural concoction neither defined nor contemplated by the 
Bankruptcy Code.77 The Jevic majority was careful to say that it took no 
position on the propriety of structured dismissals.78 Parsimony here is 
not surprising because no one in Jevic challenged the legality of 
                                                     
71. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 984 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-835, at 33 (1994)). 
72. Id. (quoting Roe & Tung, supra note 12, at 1243, 1236). 
73. Id. (quoting Markell, supra note 12, at 123). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)). 
76. Id. at 984–86. 
77. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion relied on a definition supplied by an American Bankruptcy 
Institute study, characterizing a structured dismissal as a “‘hybrid dismissal and [plan] confirmation 
order . . . that . . . typically dismisses the case while, among other things, approving certain 
distributions to creditors, granting certain third-party releases, enjoining certain conduct by 
creditors, and not necessarily vacating orders or unwinding transactions undertaken during the 
case.’” Id. at 979 (quoting ABI REPORT, supra note 7, at 270). 
78. Id. at 985 (the Court “express[ed] no view about the legality of structured dismissals in 
general”). 
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structured dismissals, as such. But it is unfortunate, because structured 
dismissals are governed by a “for cause” standard, which provides little 
guidance to lower courts.79 The absence of clear standards has, in turn, 
created ambiguities that powerful stakeholders such as senior creditors 
(here, CIT and Sun) may exploit to control the reorganization process, as 
nearly happened in Jevic. 
1. Approval Standards—“Cause” 
Structured dismissals are governed by several provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which give bankruptcy judges a wide berth in 
deciding whether to approve them. First, Bankruptcy Code section 1112 
provides that a court may dismiss a Chapter 11 case for “cause,”80 and 
lists sixteen non-exclusive factors that count as cause to grant a 
dismissal motion.81 These include “substantial or continuing loss to or 
diminution of the estate and the absence of a reasonable likelihood of 
rehabilitation.”82 This is important because Chapter 11 debtors, 
including Jevic, often enter bankruptcy with assets fully encumbered (or 
nearly so). This leaves them at or near the point of administrative 
insolvency—a financial condition where the debtor cannot even pay its 
operating expenses during the case.83 If a corporate debtor is 
administratively insolvent, there may well be little “likelihood of 
rehabilitation,” and thus “cause” to dismiss the case.84 
Second, structured dismissals are governed in part by Bankruptcy 
Code section 363, which deals with non-ordinary-course uses of 
property.85 When a debtor, such as Jevic, commences a Chapter 11 case, 
                                                     
79. See In re Biolitec, Inc., 528 B.R. 261, 269 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2014) (“‘Not much law, statutory 
or otherwise, exists regarding structured dismissals . . . .’” (quoting In re Buffet Partners, No. 14-
30699-HDH-11, 2014 WL 3735804, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 28, 2014))). 
80. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1) (2012) (“[T]he court shall convert a case under this chapter to a case 
under chapter 7 or dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interests of creditors 
and the estate, for cause . . . .”). 
81. Id. § 1112(b)(4)(A). One could quibble with the number sixteen. Some enumerated factors 
actually contain sub-factors. See, e.g., id. § 1112(b)(4)(J) (listing “failure to file a disclosure 
statement, or to file or confirm a plan, within the time fixed by this title or by order of the court”). 
82. Id. § 1112(b)(4)(A). 
83. Administrative insolvency means that a debtor is unable to pay the ongoing expenses of 
operating in bankruptcy, which courts often find to be grounds to convert or dismiss a case. See, 
e.g., In re Acme Cake Co., 495 B.R. 212, 217 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010).  
84. But that may prove too much because debtors are so frequently near administrative 
insolvency. See ABI REPORT, supra note 7, at 173 (noting that “‘administratively insolvent’ cases 
have become more common”). 
85. To determine whether a transaction falls outside the ordinary course of business, courts utilize 
both a “horizontal” and “vertical” test. The horizontal test evaluates whether, from an industry-wide 
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an “estate” is created, comprised of all of the company’s property.86 
Corporate managers become fiduciaries of the estate, for the benefit of 
general unsecured creditors,87 as “debtor in possession” (DIP). While the 
DIP may run the business as usual during bankruptcy, managers may not 
use estate (company) property outside the ordinary course absent court 
approval.88 
Because a structured dismissal seeks to make a final distribution of 
estate property, a structured dismissal would do just that. Courts tend to 
defer to management’s good faith business judgment regarding non-
ordinary uses of property under section 363.89 As with “cause” to 
dismiss, it will not be difficult to show a business justification where a 
debtor is administratively insolvent. In essence, proponents would argue 
that the structured dismissal for purposes of section 363 is a fancy “sale” 
of all of the debtor’s assets. If, as happened in Jevic below, the DIP and 
senior creditors have agreed to this, courts understandably find 
themselves tempted to go along, even if “mid-priority” creditors object. 
Third, because a structured dismissal also appears to involve a 
“settlement,” it is governed by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 
9019,90 a rule with even less content than the sales provisions of section 
363. This rule—not technically a part of the Bankruptcy Code—provides 
simply that “[o]n motion by the [DIP] and after notice and a hearing, the 
court may approve a compromise or settlement.”91 
Courts recognize that approval of a proposed settlement is not a “fait 
accompli.”92 They must assess it under some standard. In 1968, the 
Supreme Court held in the pre-Code Protective Committee for 
Independent Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson93 case 
                                                     
perspective, the transaction at issue is one that is commonly taken by companies in the industry. The 
vertical test evaluates whether, from a hypothetical creditor’s perspective, “the transaction subjects 
a creditor to economic risk of a nature different than those he accepted when he decided to extend 
credit.” In re Nellson Nutraceutical Inc., 369 B.R. 787, 797 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007). Failure to satisfy 
either the horizontal or vertical test may render a transaction outside the ordinary course. See In re 
Roth Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 953 (3d Cir. 1992). 
86. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). 
87. Id. §§ 1107–1108. 
88. Id. § 363(b)(1). 
89. In re Kennedy, 552 B.R. 183, 194 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2016); In re Shary, 152 B.R. 724, 725 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993); see also Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel 
Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983). 
90. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019. 
91. Id. 
92. In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d 547, 551–52 (3d Cir. 2015). 
93. 390 U.S. 414 (1968).  
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that settlements must be “fair and equitable.”94 This phrase has become 
code (and Code) for “absolute priority.” One of the main doctrinal points 
of contention in Jevic was whether this notion of priority applied to the 
settlement in Jevic or only, as the lower courts held, to plans of 
reorganization, whose rules do indeed codify the “fair and equitable” 
standard as one of absolute priority.95 While the Jevic Court decisively 
answered this particular doctrinal question—the absolute priority 
standard governs final distributions in Chapter 11, even if made via a 
settlement—the majority opinion did not provide clarity about how 
bankruptcy courts should assess settlements generally. 
This, too, is a problem because, in addition to (or perhaps in lieu of) 
TMT Trailer Ferry’s absolute priority rule, courts have held that they 
must weigh the “value of the claim that is being compromised against 
the value to the estate of the acceptance of the compromise proposal.”96 
This, in turn, asks a court to apply a multifactor test which, at least in the 
Third Circuit (the source of Jevic), is set out in In re Martin97: “(1) the 
probability of success in litigation; (2) the likely difficulties in 
collection; (3) the complexity of the litigation involved, and the expense, 
inconvenience and delay necessarily attending it; and (4) the paramount 
interest of the creditors.”98 
There is, unfortunately, no necessary connection between any of these 
four “Martin” factors and the absolute priority rule upheld in Jevic. 
These factors assume the existence of a litigated dispute. While that was 
the case in Jevic, it need not be, because ordinary adversarial litigation 
need not occur in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Indeed, as explained below, 
given senior creditors’ power to usurp the Chapter 11 process, such 
lawsuits are likely to dwindle. Moreover, it provides no guidance on 
how a court is supposed to decide what constitutes the “paramount 
interests of creditors.” If we care only (or mostly) about senior creditors, 
then whatever they want will be “paramount.” If, instead, we care about 
                                                     
94. Id. at 424. Although TMT Trailer Ferry involved a compromise and settlement, it occurred 
before promulgation of Rule 9019. Courts under current law nevertheless look to it for guidance 
when asked to approve settlements in bankruptcy. See Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 462–63 (2d Cir. 2007).  
95. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 983–84 (2017); see also 11 
U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012). 
96. In re World Health Alts., Inc., 344 B.R. 291, 296 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
97. 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996). 
98. Id.; see also In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d 547, 551–52 (3d Cir. 2015) (applying Martin 
factors). 
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other mid- or low-priority creditors, we might take a different view.99 
Although Congress designed the Bankruptcy Code to protect the latter, 
Chapter 11 is increasingly dominated by the former, aided by 
innovations such as structured dismissals. 
2. Problems with Structured Dismissals—Effect 
The standards by which courts should assess structured dismissals are 
unclear, leaving judges exposed to pressure from senior creditors who 
wish to use them to resolve Chapter 11 cases to their liking. While this 
contributes to uncertainty, the harder doctrinal question, only partially 
answered by Jevic, involves their effect if approved. 
As noted above, Bankruptcy Code section 349 provides, in pertinent 
part, that “[u]nless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of a 
case . . . (3) revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such 
property was vested immediately before the commencement of the case 
under this title.”100 Thus, as with the decision whether to dismiss, 
altering the prebankruptcy status quo through dismissal depends on a 
showing of “cause.” 
The statute provides no examples of what might constitute “cause,” so 
courts have looked to legislative history. Congress observed that 
dismissal should “undo the bankruptcy case, as far as practicable.”101 
This means that dismissal should restore the status quo ante, so that 
creditors could pursue their remedies in other fora, such as state court. In 
Jevic, Justice Breyer recognized that the “cause” exception Congress had 
in mind involved reliance interests developed during the case.102 For 
example, if a creditor received consideration for releasing liens during 
the case, the creditor should retain the consideration if it cannot get its 
lien back.103 Yet, many of the important features of a structured 
                                                     
99. Compare In re Buffet Partners, No. 14-30699-HDH-11, 2014 WL 3735804, at *2 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. July 28, 2014) (“[T]he best interests of creditors test focuses on the interest of the entire 
creditor body; it does not focus on individual creditor interests.”), with Rollex Corp. v. Associated 
Materials, Inc. (In re Superior Siding & Window, Inc.), 14 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting 
that “the court must consider the interests of all of the creditors” and that the best interests of 
creditors are “not served by merely tallying the votes of the unsecured creditors and yielding to the 
majority interest”). 
100. 11 U.S.C. § 349(b).  
101. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 338 (1977). 
102. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 984 (2017) (“[T]his 
provision appears designed to give courts the flexibility to ‘make the appropriate orders to protect 
rights acquired in reliance on the bankruptcy case.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 338)). 
103. See, e.g., In re Sadler, 935 F.2d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 1991) (reversing lower court’s approval 
of a dismissal order that stripped a secured creditor of its collateral). 
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dismissal—in Jevic, the final distributions and release—would not 
reflect reliance on actions taken during the case. Instead, those actions 
altered the prebankruptcy status quo in reliance on actions to end the 
case. 
After Jevic, those who wish to use structured dismissals may face at 
least three questions about their effect. First, the majority opinion 
focused on one type of priority skipping—“vertical”—that meant that 
seniors and juniors could not ignore the rights of those in the middle.104 
But, there is also “horizontal” priority, which considers whether, or to 
what extent, stakeholders with the same priority receive the same 
treatment.105 That is, could the structured dismissal in Jevic have paid 
some but not all of the mid-priority claims of the drivers in order to 
“purchase” their consent? Traditional resolution mechanisms—Chapter 
11 plans and Chapter 7 liquidations—generally resist this, resting on the 
maxim “equity is equality.”106 The rules governing structured dismissals, 
however, say nothing about it, and neither does the majority in Jevic. 
Second, Jevic does not address the related practice of “gifting,” where 
senior creditors use a portion of their recovery to induce junior creditors 
to vote for a plan.107 Economically, gifting can have the same effect as 
the forbidden distributions in Jevic, because distributions may “skip” 
priority, but it is rationalized on a different theory—that the senior 
                                                     
104. See generally Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 
11, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227 (1998). 
105. See id. at 231. 
106. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial 
Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 8 (2006) (“[T]he priority scheme of the 
Code and the requirement of equal treatment of creditors within the same class is an implementation 
of the equity maxim that ‘equity is equality’—like creditors are to be treated alike.” (footnotes 
omitted)). In Chapter 11, Bankruptcy Code section 1129(b) implements this by providing that a 
reorganization plan may not “discriminate unfairly” amongst creditors in the same class. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(b)(1) (2012). Discrimination may nevertheless occur, and often arises in the context of so-
called “death-trap” provisions of Chapter 11 plans. These will reward a class with better treatment 
for voting for the plan, even if doing so provides better treatment than received by a similarly 
situated class. As the influential Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently 
explained, “death-trap . . . provisions have long been customary in Chapter 11 plans.” In re MPM 
Silicones, LLC, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 WL 4637175, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2014) 
(citing In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 275 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2007); In re 
Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 138 B.R. 714, 717 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1992)).  
107. Compare In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 514–16 (3d Cir. 2005), with 
Hargreaves v. Nuverra Envtl. Sols., Inc. (In re Nuverra Envtl. Sols., Inc.), No. 17-10949-KJC, 2017 
WL 3326453, at *3 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 3, 2017) (distinguishing Armstrong and affirming 
confirmation of plan that made a “gift from senior lenders to certain, but not all, classes of general 
unsecured creditors”), In re World Health Alts., Inc., 344 B.R. 291, 297 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) 
(approving senior creditor “gift”), and In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d 547, 549 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(same). 
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creditor is using “its” property and not the estate’s.108 The bankruptcy 
process should be indifferent to the ways in which a creditor uses its 
property and so, on this view, gifting is outside the purview of 
bankruptcy judges. Although an important and controversial practice—
courts appear to be split on whether it is permissible109—Jevic offers no 
direct guidance on whether it may continue. 
Third, the distributive rights vindicated in Jevic are hardly the only 
ones that a structured dismissal might compromise. In Jevic, for 
example, the senior creditors sought the structured dismissal in part to 
escape potential liability for the failed LBO, which might have 
constituted a fraudulent transfer.110 To avoid this liability, the structured 
dismissal approved would have prevented anyone—including the 
objecting drivers—from suing the senior creditors on these theories 
outside of bankruptcy, after dismissal.111 In principle, one party cannot 
“agree” to eliminate the rights of another, but that is what the structured 
dismissal sought to do.112 
II. CONSENT—THE SOLUTION? 
Jevic suggests that the foregoing problems with structured dismissals 
could be cured with “the affected creditors’ consent.”113 While this has 
intuitive appeal—bankruptcy is designed to promote negotiated 
                                                     
108. In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d at 549. 
109. Compare In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d at 514–16 (forbidding inter-class transfers 
to junior stakeholders), with In re World Health Alts., 344 B.R. at 297 (approving secured creditor 
“gift” to general unsecured creditors). 
110. As explained below, the LBO suit was predicated on the view that transfers in the LBO 
(including liens granted to secure CIT’s loan financing the transaction) were constructively 
fraudulent under, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548.  
111. Specifically, the Settlement Agreement releases CIT and Sun from:  
[A]ny and all claims or counterclaims, causes of action, remedies, damages, liabilities, debts, 
suits, demands, actions, costs, expenses, fees, controversies, set-offs, third party actions or 
proceedings relating in any way to, or arising from any transaction with or in connection to, the 
Debtors or their estates of whatever kind or nature . . . including, without limitation, any and all 
claims asserted in or which could have been asserted in, or which related to the subject matter 
of the Adversary Proceeding, or which are based on any avoidance or other powers afforded 
the Estate Releasing Parties under the Bankruptcy Code . . . . 
Exhibit A to Joint Motion: Settlement Agreement, supra note 48, ¶ 2(c)(i). 
112. Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986) 
(“[P]arties who choose to resolve litigation through settlement may not dispose of the claims of a 
third party, and a fortiori may not impose duties or obligations on a third party, without that party’s 
agreement.”). 
113. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017). 
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solutions114—it simply pushes the question back one step: what is 
“consent” in this context? Under a Chapter 11 plan, consent is shown by 
a creditor vote.115 But, because the Bankruptcy Code creates no 
mechanism to vote on structured dismissals—or most important matters 
other than reorganization plans—courts after Jevic will be asked to think 
more seriously about what constitutes consent in Chapter 11 cases, 
which will be challenging for reasons discussed in this Part. 
A. Problems with Consent 
Even outside of bankruptcy, Prosser noted, the question of “consent” 
“is one of the most complex and difficult in the entire area of the law.”116 
The scale and multilateral character of most Chapter 11 cases only 
exacerbate this. 
Problems of consent here usually take one of three forms: (1) false 
positives; (2) false negatives; and (3) strategic dissent. 
 
x A “false positive” means that there is some affirmative indication 
that a party has agreed to something in a case, but the assent is 
compromised. It may be the product of mistake, duress, bad faith, 
or worse. 
x A “false negative” means that there is no affirmative indication of 
assent or dissent (objection), but a judge mistakenly interprets 
silence as assent. 
x A “strategic dissent” is an objection made not on the merits, but 
instead for some other instrumental end.117 
 
While all three are problematic, the second may be worst because it is 
so difficult to know what to infer from silence. If, for example, the 
drivers in Jevic had not retained separate counsel and objected 
                                                     
114. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Bargaining Bankrupt: A Relational Theory of Contract in 
Bankruptcy, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 239, 256 (2016). 
115. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (setting forth plan voting rules). Although beyond the scope of this paper, 
“consent” is also an issue in municipal bankruptcies under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 
Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 
55, 105 (2016) (“The Detroit court used . . . [the consent standard under Chapter 9] as an oversight 
tool. That approach puts a premium on a municipality exercising free choice.”). 
116. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18, at 112 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
117. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, Understanding Failure: Examiners and the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large Public Companies, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 3 (2010) (“[J]udges are often 
reluctant to appoint an examiner if there is no apparent benefit to the estate or if a party requests one 
for transparently strategic reasons.”). 
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vigorously to the structured dismissal, should the bankruptcy court have 
approved the settlement anyway, on the theory that silence was consent? 
1. We Know It When We See It 
Professors Klee and Bussel have spent the most time thinking about 
what consent means in bankruptcy, arguing that it is (or should be) a 
“contextualized inquiry that draws on both experience and judgment.”118 
They identify ten factors (“no doubt there are many others”) that they 
“believe are often relevant to fixing appropriate consent requirements 
and standards in bankruptcy.”119 These factors balance “legitimacy and 
autonomy values . . . against the efficiency of dictating a given result by 
mandatory rule.”120 
Klee and Bussel’s instincts seem consistent with the reasoning of 
Jevic—process-quality matters121—but their approach may leave too 
many degrees of freedom. First, it is not clear whether they are 
describing the matters as to which consent may be an appropriate 
resolution standard or, instead, how to decide if there is, in fact, 
consent.122 It may be one, the other, or both, but they do not say.123 
Second, if we take the question to involve the latter—have parties 
consented?—it is not clear which factors matter, or how courts should 
weight them in a dispute. Consider their first two: the “sophistication, 
knowledge and bargaining power of the putative consenting parties;” 
and the “number, and degree of geographical or other dispersion, of the 
putative consenting parties.”124 It is not clear how a bankruptcy judge in 
a case with hundreds or thousands of creditors can know these things 
with confidence. Judges could require representatives in the case—in 
                                                     
118. Bussel & Klee, supra note 15, at 718. 
119. Id. at 717; see also id. at 719 (“[L]egitimacy and autonomy values must be weighed against 
the efficiency of dictating a given result by mandatory rule.”). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. (“[W]e . . . should be wary of sacrificing too quickly the legitimacy consent confers on 
the altar of efficient administration or other bankruptcy values.”).  
122. Id. at 718 (writing courts should “consider . . . the extent to which consent is a necessary or 
sufficient predicate to the transformation of legal rights”). 
123. Take a simple example. Creditors with statutory priority, such as the drivers in Jevic, may 
consent to waive their priority rights, so this would be a matter as to which consent is a permissible 
resolution mechanism. But, in the context of confirming a plan of reorganization, a court must find 
that the proposed plan is “feasible.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2012). In theory, this is an 
independent judicial assessment; no amount of “consent” should supplant the court’s independent 
judgment. Klee and Bussel do not tell us whether consent should be effective in both cases, or only 
in the first.  
124. Bussel & Klee, supra note 15, at 718. 
05 - Lipson(2).docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018 9:21 PM 
2018] THE SECRET LIFE OF PRIORITY 655 
 
particular, counsel to the unsecured creditors’ committee—to obtain 
something like proxies from each creditor as to each matter. But 
unsophisticated parties may mistakenly agree (a false positive). More 
likely, parties may simply say nothing (possibly a false negative). In any 
case, how much money would we want a debtor’s estate to spend on 
this? Voting is expensive. While its costs are clear, its benefits are often 
opaque. 
Klee and Bussel would seem to give to bankruptcy judges a great deal 
of discretion in deciding when consent is appropriate, and how to decide 
whether it exists. These judges would, to paraphrase Justice Stewart, 
“know it when they see it.”125 This, however, provides little guidance for 
bankruptcy judges trying to resolve difficult problems in complex cases. 
2. Consent and Economic Stakes 
Apart from indeterminacy, consent presents other problems: whose 
consent (or dissent) counts, and how do we decide? The Jevic majority 
spoke of “affected” creditors, suggesting that we should care about the 
consent of parties with a substantive economic stake in the outcome.126 It 
was not hard to see that the creditors in Jevic were “affected” by the 
structured dismissal there: no one disputed their priority, or the fact that 
estate property (proceeds of the fraudulent transfer settlement) would 
have “skipped” over that priority had the Court upheld the lower courts. 
The Jevic drivers were, in the vernacular, “in the money.” But that will 
not always be so clear. 
In In re Petersburg Regency LLC,127 for example, the Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of New Jersey concluded that objections of 
shareholders of an insolvent corporation did not count.128 The 
Petersburg debtor was a hotel that suffered hurricane damage; its only 
asset was about $9 million in insurance proceeds.129 The senior creditors 
were undersecured, meaning their liens fully encumbered the assets. 
They and all non-insider creditors agreed to a structured dismissal in 
                                                     
125. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall not today 
attempt to further define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand 
description [hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But 
I know it when I see it . . . .”). 
126. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017). 
127. 540 B.R. 508 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015). 
128. Id. at 531. 
129. Id. at 532–33. 
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which the senior creditors shared their recovery with junior creditors, but 
not with the debtor’s principals.130 “Unlike Jevic,” the court noted, 
[N]o class of creditors—priority or otherwise—is being 
“skipped” and there is unanimous support for the Settlement 
among the Debtor’s non-insider creditors. Only the [equity 
owners], as insiders, oppose the Settlement and Structured 
Dismissal, as their interests are directly opposed to the non-
insider creditors. Thus, this Court finds and determines that the 
Settlement and Structured Dismissal is plainly in the best 
interests of the Debtor’s creditors and the estate.131 
Because the Petersburg court concluded that the principals were “out of 
the money,” their objections would not prevent the court from approving 
the structured dismissal.132 
This, however, begs two questions. First, who gets to decide that the 
objectors were out of the money? In many cases, it will not be difficult 
to know, because the debtor will obviously be insolvent. But valuation is 
often one of the more difficult and disputed challenges bankruptcy 
courts face. Because reorganization may seek to reallocate the future 
value of a business to today’s stakeholders, the risks and costs of error 
are high. Although Jevic was not a reorganization, the senior creditors 
there could plausibly have claimed that the mid-priority drivers were out 
of the money, because the debtor’s assets were fully encumbered. 
Absent the fraudulent transfer claims asserted in the LBO suit, who 
would have been in a position to challenge that? 
Second, why are economic stakes the only ones that matter? For some 
years, a small group of academics argued that bankruptcy should be 
understood as involving more than simply economic adjustments: it 
should advance other normative values.133 Courts have largely ignored 
this approach, at least as a substantive matter. Indeed, even when the 
Bankruptcy Code specifically designates a non-economic actor—the 
United States Trustee (UST)—to monitor and challenge matters in 
Chapter 11 cases, judges are skeptical. In In re Buffet Partners,134 for 
example,135 the parties sought a structured dismissal for the reasons one 
                                                     
130. Id. at 545. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 543. 
133. See, e.g., Donald R. Korobkin, Bankruptcy Law, Ritual, and Performance, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2124, 2150 (2003) (discussing “[b]ankruptcy law’s struggle to manage a normative ‘departure’ 
without normative ‘offense’”). 
134. No. 14-30699-HDH-11, 2014 WL 3735804 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 28, 2014). 
135. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 985 (citing In re Buffet Partners, 2014 WL 3735804, at *1).  
05 - Lipson(2).docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018 9:21 PM 
2018] THE SECRET LIFE OF PRIORITY 657 
 
would expect: the debtor’s assets had been sold, and there was only a pot 
of cash to distribute among creditors.136 The creditors’ committee and 
debtor agreed to settle and dismiss the case and sent notice of the 
proposed structured dismissal to creditors.137 Only the UST objected.138 
In approving the structured dismissal over the UST’s objection, the court 
observed: 
It is important to emphasize that not one party with an economic 
stake in the case has objected to the dismissal in this manner. 
While this fact is not outcome determinative, it is still worthy of 
consideration. All of the following parties affirmatively assent to 
the proposed dismissal: the Debtor, the Lender, and the 
Committee, which represents a large portion of the unsecured 
debt. The UST is the sole objecting party.139 
The intuition behind Buffet Partners is easy to understand: Chapter 11 
is a system to adjust economic losses, and, except when acting in a 
pecuniary capacity, the government should not impede an efficient 
mechanism for doing that. Yet, simply saying that we should consider 
only the objections of economic stakeholders ignores the reality that 
Chapter 11 is a hybrid, public-private process. Because it occurs in and 
around courts, it is (or should be) more than simply a negotiated 
reallocation of wealth. How to determine which economic stakes count 
for purposes of determining consent, and whether (or to what extent) the 
consent of non-economic participants should count, will be difficult 
questions going forward. Jevic tells us nothing about this. 
                                                     
136. In re Buffet Partners, 2014 WL 3735804, at *1 (“There now remains a fixed sum of money 
to be distributed.”). 
137. Id. (“The Settlement Motion was noticed out . . . .”). 
138. Id. (“The United States Trustee was the only party to object.”). The status of the UST is 
somewhat unusual. Its officers (“trustees” and their assistants) are public officials who “protect the 
integrity of the bankruptcy system.” In re Youk-See, 450 B.R. 312, 323 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011); see 
also Morgenstern v. Revco D.S., Inc. (In re Revco D.S., Inc.), 898 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(describing the United States trustee as “a watchdog rather than an advocate” protecting the public 
interest). The program’s director, Clifford White, recently testified before Congress to the ostensible 
non-economic interests that the UST represents. Director Clifford J. White III of the Executive 
Office for U.S. Trustees Testifies Before the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on 
Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law at a Hearing on Oversight of U.S. Trustee 
Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 8, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/director-
clifford-j-white-iii-executive-office-united-states-trustees-testifies-us-hous-0 
[https://perma.cc/V8Z2-5JUU] (“The Jevic case stands as a good example of the role the USTP can 
play in reorganization cases. As the only neutral party and one without a pecuniary interest, we are 
able to ensure that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are followed by all parties to the case.”).  
139. In re Buffet Partners, 2014 WL 3735804, at *4. 
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3. Consent in Aggregate Litigation 
Courts concerned about consent in bankruptcy may also look to the 
standards that apply to the settlement of aggregate litigations. The 
American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law: Aggregate Litigation 
(Principles) defines an “aggregate lawsuit” as “a single lawsuit that 
encompasses claims or defenses held by multiple parties or represented 
persons.”140 These include “mass-tort actions, class actions, derivative 
lawsuits, actions naming multiple conspirators, and inventory 
settlements.”141 The Principles recognize that “[b]ankruptcy proceedings 
also meet this definition and provide helpful examples and lessons,”142 
but do not address them specifically.143 
Although the Principals do not formally apply to Chapter 11 cases, it 
is easy to see the analogy when assessing structured dismissals. 
Aggregate lawsuits and Chapter 11 cases both involve many claimants 
asserting claims against a common defendant or debtor. The debtor in 
Jevic, for example, indicated that it believed it had between 5,001 and 
10,000 creditors, and this was not an especially large case, as large cases 
go.144 Both likely involve settlements rather than adjudicated resolution 
to bring closure to underlying disputes. Both require party consent to 
settle, although individuated, affirmative evidence of consent may be 
costly and implausible to obtain.145 
                                                     
140. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
141. Id. § 1.02 cmt. a. 
142. Id. 
143. The ALI did not seek to “set out principles designed to govern these proceedings” for the 
rather odd reason that bankruptcy is “regulated by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.” Id. 
The stated reason makes no sense. While there may be cause to treat Chapter 11 cases differently 
from the aggregate proceedings that concerned the ALI, the presence or absence of rules of 
bankruptcy procedure could not matter. Among other reasons, those rules largely incorporate the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which apply to “adversary proceedings” and (to a more limited 
extent) “contested matters.” See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001 & 9014(c) (defining scope of adversary 
proceedings and contested matters in bankruptcy). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure specifically incorporate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on class actions, meaning that 
the mechanics of aggregate litigation are formally subsumed in Chapter 11 reorganization. FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 7023. 
144. Voluntary Petition at 1, In re Jevic Holding Corp., No. 08-11006 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. May 
20, 2008). 
145. Chapter 11 cases are more like “non-class” aggregate lawsuits than class actions, however, 
because creditors’ claims will arise from different types of facts, involve different questions of law, 
and so make class certification implausible under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. See Alan N. 
Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2045, 2059 (2000) (“The classification of claims under a Chapter 11 plan differs 
significantly, however, from the creation of a class for Rule 23 class action purposes.”).  
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The “non-class” aggregate lawsuit (or “quasi-class action”146) has 
become an important and controversial substitute for formal class 
actions. Non-class aggregate litigations present process problems similar 
to those involved in structured dismissals. In theory, a court may not 
approve the settlement of a non-class aggregate lawsuit unless all parties 
consent.147 In practice, however, the settlements of the Zyprexa148 and 
Vioxx149 litigations show that crafty lawyers have developed techniques 
to make it virtually impossible for their clients to resist.150 
                                                     
146. Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389, 394 
(2011) (arguing that a quasi-class action is “a court’s short-hand description for collective litigation 
where numerous plaintiffs are consolidated under simple joinder rules”); see also McKenzie, supra 
note 17, at 1016 (“In the quasi-class action, plaintiffs who pursue claims against a defendant are 
drawn into an aggregate proceeding in a single forum that effectively monopolizes the resolution of 
their claims. . . . Like a bankruptcy case, the quasi-class action is held together by a centralized 
forum containing individual claims—claims that are not fused into a single collective governed by a 
representative with delegated authority (as in a class action).”).  
147. See Nancy J. Moore, The Case Against Changing the Aggregate Settlement Rule in Mass 
Tort Lawsuits, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 149, 165 (1999) (“As interpreted by courts, however, the 
aggregate settlement rule forbids lawyers from entering settlement over the objection of any 
plaintiff, even when that plaintiff has agreed in advance to be bound by a vote of a majority or a 
supermajority.”); Nancy J. Moore, The Absence of Legal Ethics in the ALI’s Principles of the Law 
of Aggregate Litigation: A Missed Opportunity—and More, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 717, 718 
(2011) (discussing a proposed change to the ethics rules that would allow claimants to “agree in 
advance, under certain circumstances, to be bound by a majority vote in favor of a particular 
settlement”). But see PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 140, § 3.17 
(providing the requirements for using informed consent to allow multiple clients to use a substantial 
majority vote to accept aggregate settlements).  
148. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). The 
Zyprexa settlement was the result of extensive multi-district litigation across the United States for 
personal injuries against the manufacturer of Zyprexa, a prescription drug used to treat 
schizophrenia. Id. In Zyprexa, a “contractual nonclass aggregate settlement” occurred, which 
Professor Mullenix argues is “a concept that deliberately resonates in the familiar language of the 
class action while simultaneously rejecting the class concept in favor of a unit of ‘aggregate claims’ 
resolved instead by contract.” See Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of 
Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 541 (2013). From this emerged what she 
calls the “judicial invention” of the “quasi-class action,” or simply the “logical extension of, and 
corollary to, the contractual nonclass aggregate settlement.” Id. at 542.  
149. Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc. and the Counsel Listed on the Signature 
Pages Hereto (Nov. 9, 2007), http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Master%20Settle 
ment%20Agreement%20-%20new.pdf [https://perma.cc/83P6-A72R]. 
150. As Erichson and Zipursky explain, the lawyers in Vioxx made it very difficult for the clients 
to resist settling for two reasons: 
First, under the terms of the agreement, for a lawyer to participate in the deal—that is, for any 
of the lawyer’s clients to avail themselves of the settlement offer—the lawyer was required to 
recommend the settlement to all of the lawyer’s eligible clients. Second, if any clients decided 
not to participate in the settlement, the lawyer was required to withdraw from representing the 
nonsettling clients. A client wishing to decline the settlement, in other words, faced the 
prospect of losing her lawyer and finding that every other lawyer handling Vioxx claims was 
similarly unavailable. 
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In the quasi-class action, consent will likely be manifest by counsel, 
who will represent that their clients have agreed to the settlement. 
Assuming the lawyers actually have this authority, it will be fairly easy 
for the court to approve the settlement. This may not be a safe 
assumption, however, because it is not clear how a court can know that 
all plaintiffs have in fact consented or have done so on an informed 
basis. Critics worry that the rise of these non-class lawsuits excessively 
empowers lawyers, at the risk of harming their clients.151 
In form, this resembles the problem in Jevic. There, counsel to the 
creditors’ committee had negotiated the structured dismissal with the 
debtor and senior creditors. The committee theoretically represented all 
unsecured creditors—including the drivers—but its counsel could be 
paid only if the bankruptcy court approved the structured dismissal. In 
fact, however, the drivers’ objection—and their retention of separate 
counsel—indicated that the drivers did not consent. But what if the 
drivers had not had separate counsel or had failed to assert a formal 
objection? Should the bankruptcy judge have inferred from the presence 
of their priority claims that they should have objected, that their silence 
was a false negative? Or should the judge infer from silence that they 
consented to the settlement—even though it was designed to strip their 
right to recover? 
The Principles attempt to manage these problems through the lens of 
legal ethics. The Principles provide, for example, that counsel must 
inform clients of the financial effects of the settlement on both the 
clients and counsel: 
A lawyer or group of lawyers who represent two or more 
claimants on a non-class basis may settle the claims of those 
claimants on an aggregate basis provided that each claimant 
gives informed consent in writing. Informed consent requires 
that each claimant be able to review the settlements of all other 
persons subject to the aggregate settlement or the formula by 
which the settlement will be divided among all claimants. 
Further, informed consent requires that the total financial 
interest of claimants’ counsel be disclosed to each claimant.152 
                                                     
Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 18, at 266. Nearly all plaintiffs in fact agreed. Id. (“One year later, 
the Claims Administrator reported that over 99.79% of the eligible claimants had enrolled.”). 
151. Id. at 317 (criticizing non-class settlements because they empower lawyers and “the 
empowerment of the lawyer is not purely in service of a better deal for clients. In this setting, the 
lawyer acquires more money than any of her clients”). 
152. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 140, § 3.17(a). 
05 - Lipson(2).docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018 9:21 PM 
2018] THE SECRET LIFE OF PRIORITY 661 
 
The structured dismissal in Jevic may have flunked the Principles’ 
standards because it is not clear whether counsel adequately disclosed its 
financial interest to creditors.153 Nor is it clear how they could have done 
so. If by “counsel” we mean counsel to the settling parties—the debtors, 
senior lenders, and creditors’ committee—then their fees may not be 
known until after the underlying matters are resolved because these 
professionals are paid by the bankruptcy estate. While it may be possible 
to estimate their fees along the way, they cannot be paid until the court 
approves a formal request for payment through a fee application, which 
may be an hourly rate not known until at or near the time of the final 
hearing.154 In aggregate litigation, by contrast, it appears that counsel are 
often paid a percentage of the settlement’s value, which can be estimated 
ex ante.155 There is no obvious reason professional fees in bankruptcy 
could not be tailored to satisfy the Principles’ standards. Current 
practice, however, would not fit well with them. 
4. Consent and Due Process 
Behind the ALI’s concerns about legal ethics are concerns about due 
process. The ALI recognizes that the legitimacy of consensual 
resolutions of aggregate litigation “is a creature of due process . . . . A 
party can be bound [to the settlement] when given notice and an 
opportunity to be heard.”156 Although the Principles do not cite it, the 
obvious reference here is to Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co.,157 which applies in bankruptcy and in all aggregate litigations. 
                                                     
153. The Order approving the Dismissal Motion approves the payment of $200,000 in 
professional fees of the creditors’ committee, Dismissal Order, supra note 5, ¶ 8, but the Dismissal 
Motion itself indicates that those fees were subject to future determination, see Dismissal Motion, 
supra note 45, ¶ 17 (directing professionals to file fee applications after entry of the Dismissal 
Order).  
154. See Stephen J. Lubben, The Chapter 11 Financial Advisors, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 11, 
13 (2011) (“[U]nder § 330 of the Bankruptcy Code and under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 
Procedure 2016, all professionals retained by either the debtor or an official committee (most often 
a creditors’ committee) must file fee applications with the court before they can be paid from estate 
funds.”). 
155. Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-
District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 109 (2010) (“Over the long 
history of MDLs [multidistrict litigations], judges have awarded lead attorneys billions of dollars in 
fees and cost reimbursements. Typically, fee awards range from 4 percent to 6 percent of total 
recoveries, but smaller and larger percentages can be found. This practice supposedly rests on the 
common fund doctrine, a creature of the law of restitution which undergirds fee awards in class 
actions.”).  
156. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 140, § 1.05 cmt. c. 
157. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
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In Mullane, administrators of a trust sought a declaratory judgment to 
determine the rights of beneficiaries with respect to a trust corpus. 
Although the administrators had the names and addresses of some 
beneficiaries, they only published notice of the declaratory judgment 
action in newspapers, notice that the Supreme Court viewed as “[no] 
more than a feint.”158 The Supreme Court held that “[a]n elementary and 
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to 
be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action 
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”159 
The issue before the Court in Mullane involved two aspects of the 
constitutional requirement of notice: (1) what type of notice does due 
process require, and (2) who must receive it?160 The opinion is most 
famous for the first—it must be sufficiently informative to enable the 
recipient to know that a court is about to do something important. The 
second, however, focuses on the characteristics of the recipients, and the 
lengths to which the administrators had to go to provide individualized 
notice. As Tobias Wolff has pointed out, Mullane seems best understood 
as asking courts to engage in a cost-benefit analysis, weighing the 
substantive stakes of potential recipients against the costs of providing 
individualized notice.161 
Mullane’s sensitivity to cost-benefit analysis seems especially 
important in Chapter 11, where the opinion has been relevant for 
determining the time and expense to which a corporate debtor must go to 
identify creditors, and provide individualized notice of important matters 
in the case, in particular the “bar date,” after which claims against the 
                                                     
158. Id. at 315; see also id. at 307–10 (describing the manner in which notice was required to be, 
and was, given). 
159. Id. at 314. 
160. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the 
Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2098 (2008). 
161. Id. at 2099–100 (“The less definite, concrete, and extant a person’s property interest, the less 
urgent is the need for providing individualized process to absentees, particularly when the 
proceeding is structured so as to provide additional assurance that those interests will be 
safeguarded in the class member’s absence. Although not making the point explicit, the Court 
suggested a sliding-scale approach to the analysis, with those interests that ‘are so remote as to be 
ephemeral’ requiring no individualized process at all.” (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317)). Thus, 
“[a] creditor’s identity is ‘reasonably ascertainable’ if that creditor can be identified through 
‘reasonably diligent efforts.’” Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 346 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 n.4 (1983)). “Reasonable diligence,” in 
turn, “does not require ‘impracticable and extended searches . . . in the name of due process.’” Id. 
(quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317). 
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debtor may not be asserted.162 Concerns about notice in a Chapter 11 
case dominate mass tort bankruptcies, such as those involving asbestos, 
where the general harm may be known at the time of bankruptcy, but the 
identities of victims are unknown—and unknowable—because the 
damage may take many years to manifest itself.163 The Second Circuit’s 
recent decision reversing the lower court in the General Motors ignition 
switch litigation because the debtor knew the identities of car purchasers 
and nonetheless failed to send them notice is a reminder that courts must 
take Mullane’s due process values seriously, even in bankruptcy.164 
“Due process” is, however, a standard that is both grand and vague. It 
purports to instill confidence in the legitimacy of legal process, yet is 
quite hazy about how to do so in any given case. We tend to think of due 
process as involving binary disputes, in particular efforts by government 
to take life, liberty, or property. In Chapter 11 bankruptcy, however, the 
role of government is opaque and diffuse: bankruptcy judges are 
obviously government actors, but they engage in a deliberately complex 
set of interactions with participants and their representatives in ways that 
make it hard to determine—or to justify spending the money to 
determine—whether due process has (or has not) been satisfied. In other 
words, due process may be intimately related to consent, but it provides 
little concrete guidance on how to identify consent in corporate 
reorganizations.165 
                                                     
162. As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has explained: 
Precedent demonstrates that what is required is not a vast, open-ended investigation. . . . The 
requisite search instead focuses on the debtor’s own books and records. Efforts beyond a 
careful examination of these documents are generally not required. Only those claimants who 
are identifiable through a diligent search are “reasonably ascertainable” and hence “known” 
creditors. 
See Chemetron Corp., 72 F.3d at 346–47 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
163. These challenges have led to versions of what Bookman and Noll call “ad hoc procedure,” 
which in Chapter 11 takes the form of a “channeling injunction,” forcing asbestos victims to 
“channel” their claims against asbestos makers that have gone into bankruptcy through the Chapter 
11 process—and specialized trusts created in the reorganizations—which seek to fully and finally 
resolve the claims. See Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 767, 771–74 (2017) (discussing procedure for creating channeling injunction in Chapter 11 
cases). 
164. See Elliott v. Gen. Motors LLC (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 829 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2016).  
165. Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 669–70 (2008). For a discussion of the role of judges in Chapter 11 
cases generally, see Melissa B. Jacoby, What Should Judges Do in Chapter 11?, 2015 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 571. 
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B. Consent and Closure 
Concerns about due process values sharpen a tension embedded in 
Jevic. Chapter 11 seeks both to maximize recoveries and to provide 
some baseline procedural protections. Sometimes these goals are 
consonant; sometimes—as in Jevic—they are not. The best argument for 
privileging the distributive over the procedural—the aspiration of the 
senior creditors in Jevic and often elsewhere—is closure: bringing the 
case efficiently to an end. Closure is, for example, often the strongest 
argument for quasi-class action settlements outside of bankruptcy.166 By 
inducing (or coercing) clients to settle, the quasi-class settlement 
produces finality that benefits the parties and the judicial system.167 
Finality is also a key motivation for using Chapter 11. A confirmed 
plan can result in the discharge of debt, perhaps the greatest finality a 
corporate debtor can hope to achieve with respect to its stakeholders.168 
In theory, a discharge is not available if a case is dismissed.169 The 
structured dismissal in Jevic, for example, did not contain an explicit 
discharge. But it did not need one in order to achieve the same result. 
Because it sought a final distribution of all of the debtor’s assets, any 
post-dismissal litigation against it would have been pointless: after 
dismissal, Jevic would have no assets, and thus be judgment proof. In 
the unlikely event the debtor did acquire property after dismissal, the 
structured dismissal apparently preserved the liens and priority of 
CIT.170 Because it was undersecured, its lien would attach to any such 
property, further reducing the likelihood that creditors could collect from 
Jevic post-dismissal. Because the debtors in Jevic were entities, the 
shareholders (Sun) would not be liable personally for their debts, even 
after dismissal. The debtors would simply dissolve under applicable state 
law, a natural death that leaves unpaid creditors, such as the drivers, no 
practical recourse. 
                                                     
166. Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 18, at 267 (“[M]ass tort lawyers largely abandoned any 
hope that settlement class actions would be the key to finding closure. Nonclass aggregate 
settlements have filled this void . . . .”). 
167. Id. at 268 (“[C]losure is what defendants demand, and it is what plaintiffs need to offer if 
they are to maximize settlement value. The Vioxx Settlement Agreement stands as the most 
prominent real-life solution to the intractable problem of achieving closure in a mass tort settlement 
without using the class action rule and without resorting to bankruptcy.”).  
168. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (2012). 
169. In general, corporations cannot obtain a discharge absent confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization. Id. § 1141(d). A discharge is not, for example, available to a corporation that 
liquidates under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 727(a)(1). 
170. See Dismissal Order, supra note 5. 
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Moreover, CIT and Sun were released from liability in connection 
with the LBO—giving them closure. For them, it appears that this was a 
central feature of the deal. Yet, the truck drivers had objected, leaving 
the question whether they could continue to sue CIT and Sun in New 
Jersey state court under New Jersey law after the dismissal. Absent the 
“structure” of the dismissal in Jevic—the release given to Sun and 
CIT—it appears that they could have. But the deal there sought to take 
this away from them. This would have violated the letter of the law 
governing non-class aggregate settlements, where each claimant must 
signal consent.171 At least so far as the lower courts in Jevic were 
concerned, bankruptcy was different. The efficiency demands of Chapter 
11 practice—resolving the case—were to the lower courts more 
powerful than procedural protections for the drivers. 
III. PROCESS VALUES 
Although the Jevic majority disagreed with the lower courts, they did 
not tell us what constitutes consent in Chapter 11. What, then, to do? 
This Part argues that the reasoning and implications of the majority 
opinion reflect values of process-quality that courts should consider 
proxies for consent. Courts can, in other words, minimize the risk of 
false negatives and other consent errors by taking seriously Jevic’s views 
about participation, predictability, and procedural integrity. 
A. Participation 
To understand Jevic’s process values, consider what was at stake. If 
the Court had affirmed the Third Circuit, it is likely that structured 
dismissals would increasingly displace plans of reorganization as the 
principal mechanism to exit Chapter 11. By reversing, Jevic thus 
preserved the role that plans play in reorganization. This, however, 
raises a question: what is so great about plans? They can be expensive, 
complex, and cumbersome.172 Major stakeholders have for many years 
sought to reduce their costs, including through the advent of the 
                                                     
171. Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 18, at 269 (“Section 3.17(b) of [PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: 
AGGREGATE LITIGATION] presents a legal device designed to allow plaintiffs’ lawyers to bind 
clients to a group settlement. Although the proposal would require that clients as a group ratify the 
settlement by supermajority vote, it would bypass the requirement of individual 
consent. . . . Consent—not closure—determines legitimacy.”). 
172. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Rise of the Financial Advisors: An 
Empirical Study of the Division of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcies, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
141 (2008) (discussing Chapter 11 costs).  
05 - Lipson(2).docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018 9:21 PM 
666 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:631 
 
“prepackaged” plan and the rise of all-assets sales under section 363.173 
The structured dismissal was, to many, simply the next logical step in 
the efficiency-minded evolution of Chapter 11 practice. 
While plans can be costly, one of their principal virtues—threatened 
by the Jevic structured dismissal—is stakeholder participation. At a high 
level of generality, participation is a key characteristic of the U.S. legal 
system.174 Among other things, participation through judicial process 
promotes the legal “accuracy” of outcomes,175 the dignity of those 
aggrieved or accused of wrongdoing,176 and the “legitimacy” of 
outcomes.177 Moreover, participation guided by an absolute priority 
structure may increase the likelihood of efficiency gains. 
Congress designed the Chapter 11 plan process to have two key 
participatory features: 
x Disclosure. Information is a predicate to both participation and 
consent. Chapter 11 solves for this by providing that a plan cannot 
be confirmed unless it is supported by a “disclosure statement.” A 
disclosure statement is a document somewhat like a securities 
prospectus, which provides creditors with “adequate information” 
                                                     
173. See, e.g., Stephen H. Case & Mitchell A. Harwood, Current Issues in Prepackaged Chapter 
11 Plans of Reorganization and Using the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act for Instant 
Reorganizations, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 75, 83–84 (1992) (“Prepackaged plans have . . . major 
advantages over the ‘classic’ chapter 11 process: (i) a fairly high degree of assurance about the 
success and brevity of the proceeding; (ii) lower administrative costs . . . .”). 
174. “[T]he distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it confers on the 
affected party a peculiar form of participation in the decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned 
arguments for a decision in his favor.” Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. 
L. REV. 353, 364 (1978). 
175. Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of Participation, 78 IOWA L. REV. 981, 985 (1993) 
(“Adversarial presentation by parties’ lawyers enhances the likelihood of reaching a correct 
decision.”). 
176. Id.  
177. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 274 (2004) (noting “a core 
right of participation is essential for the legitimacy of adjudication”); Daniel Markovits, Adversary 
Advocacy and the Authority of Adjudication, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1367, 1371–76 (2006) (arguing 
legitimacy of government institutions depends on legitimacy with respect to both underlying 
“theoretical model,” with “emphasis on abstract propositions about justified political power,” and 
“practical approach,” with emphasis on “consequences of actual engagement” and impact of 
“participation . . . on the . . . attitudes of the participants”); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s 
Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in 
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 49–52 (1976) (linking the right to participate 
personally in adjudication with individuals’ dignity); Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving 
Legal Processes—A Plea for “Process Values,” 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1974). But cf. Louis 
Kaplow, Information and the Aim of Adjudication: Truth or Consequences?, 67 STAN. L. REV. 
1303, 1362 (2015) (“[P]articipation and other process values may have consequences that are 
relevant to social welfare, but they do not systematically relate to the truth or to the often-present 
divergence between the pursuit of truth and of consequences in legal system design.”). 
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about the plan and the debtor sufficient to enable them to vote for 
or against it.178 As a practical matter, the hearing on the motion to 
approve the disclosure statement will often channel—and 
consensually resolve—objections to the plan itself. 
x Voting. Short of a state-contingent contract, the best evidence of 
participation and consent to resolve a Chapter 11 case will be a 
vote. Chapter 11 provides that a plan must have a minimum level of 
stakeholder support, generally speaking two-thirds in dollar amount 
and more than half in number of creditors entitled to vote.179 
Outside of Chapter 11, debt obligations and associated property 
rights (e.g., liens) can be modified only if all (or almost all) 
creditors so agree.180 In Chapter 11, by contrast, the plan proponent 
(presumptively the debtor’s management) places creditors in 
classes, and then proposes “treatment” for those classes (e.g., 
payment of a percentage of the claim in cash, issuing new 
securities, etc.), which creditors accept or reject by super-majority 
vote.181 The logic of Chapter 11 substitutes participation through 
the creditor franchise for strict recognition of all pre-bankruptcy 
entitlements. 
Because structured dismissals involve neither a disclosure statement 
nor voting, the structured dismissal approved by the lower courts would 
have compromised both. But, the economic pressures that have led to the 
advent of structured dismissals are real and often conflict with 
participation as a process-value. Thus, the important questions are why 
participation is a value in Jevic, and how it should be understood in the 
resource-constrained environment of Chapter 11. 
1. Sales v. Plans—Unfinished Chrysler Business? 
Participation, like all process values, is not free, and practice under 
Chapter 11 has sought to cut these costs through the increased use of all-
                                                     
178. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2012). “Adequate information” is defined as “information of a kind, 
and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in light of the nature and history of the 
debtor and the condition of the debtor’s books and records . . . that would enable . . . a hypothetical 
investor of the relevant class to make an informed judgment about the plan.” Id. § 1125(a).  
179. Id. § 1126(c). This glosses over much complexity not especially important here, including 
that creditors are classified and vote by class. Id. § 1122(a). 
180. But cf. Marblegate Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 846 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(permitting modifications under Trust Indenture Act); id. at 11 n.7 (citing Mark J. Roe, Chaos and 
Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. Rev. 661 (1996)). 
181. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1) (requiring plan to “designate, subject to section 1122 of this title, 
classes of claims”).  
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assets sales. Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to do 
so outside of a reorganization plan, and this is how many firms in fact 
reorganize.182 “In modern bankruptcy practice,” the Third Circuit 
recently observed, a sale under section 363 “is the tool of choice to put a 
quick close to a bankruptcy case. It avoids time, expense, and, some 
would say, the Bankruptcy Code’s unbending rules.”183 Under such a 
sale, a debtor may sell all of its assets, as a whole or free from weaker 
parts. 
The all-assets sale was notoriously the path that the debtors in both In 
re Chrysler LLC184 and In re General Motors Corp.185 followed. In 
Chrysler, the United States and Canadian governments facilitated 
negotiations between Fiat and Chrysler to produce a sale agreement 
dated April 30, 2009, the same day that Chrysler filed its Chapter 11 
petition.186 Under similar government supervision, General Motors filed 
its Chapter 11 petition on June 1 and, on the same day, filed its proposed 
sale transaction under section 363.187 
The “reorganizations” were effected by selling all assets to purchasers 
owned by employees and the government, which had financed the cases. 
Creditors of the “old” automakers would still have claims against the 
debtors—but they would not receive shares of the purchaser, the future 
value of the automakers. To many, this offended horizontal equity.188 
                                                     
182. Id. § 363(b) (“The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the 
ordinary course of business, property of the estate . . . .”). See generally Brubaker & Tabb, supra 
note 16, at 1375 (“Such an internal boot-strap reorganization [has been] on the decline, and many 
reorganizations are now accomplished through a relatively expeditious going-concern sale of the 
debtor’s business and assets to a third-party purchaser, with a subsequent distribution of the 
proceeds to creditors and shareholders in accordance with their relative priority rights.”); Casey, 
supra note 13, at 760 (“The norm for today’s corporate reorganization is a quick going-concern 
sale.”). 
183. In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d 547, 549 (3d Cir. 2015). 
184. 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler 
LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009) (mem.). 
185. 407 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
186. In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 111–12. 
187. See Debtors’ Motion Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 363(b), (f), (k), & (m), & 365 & Fed. R. 
Bankr. P. 2002, 6004, & 6006, to (I) Approve (A) the Sale Pursuant to the Master Sale & Purchase 
Agreement with Vehicle Acquisition Holdings LLC, a U.S. Treasury-sponsored Purchaser, Free & 
Clear of Liens, Claims, Encumbrances, & Other Interests; (B) The Assumption & Assignment of 
Certain Executory Contracts & Unexpired Leases; & (C) Other Relief; & (II) Schedule Sale 
Approval Hearing, In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-50026 
(REG)), 2009 WL 1529573 [hereinafter GM Debtors’ Motion]. 
188. Brubaker and Tabb, for example, understandably worry that the automaker cases are “clever 
and surreptitious end-runs around chapter 11’s distributional norms.” Brubaker & Tabb, supra note 
16, at 1378. Compare Roe & Skeel, supra note 28, at 729 (arguing that the “Chrysler bankruptcy 
process used undesirable mechanisms that federal courts and Congress struggled for decades to 
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Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in Jevic addressed the automaker 
cases only in passing, with a “cf.” citation.189 His opinion did, however, 
recognize that the logic underlying the automaker cases was 
procedurally problematic. “[T]he distributions at issue” in Jevic, he 
observed, “more closely resemble proposed transactions that lower 
courts have refused to allow on the ground that they circumvent the 
Code’s procedural safeguards.”190 The “proposed transactions” he had in 
mind were all-assets sales that earlier decisions had rejected as disguised 
plans under the “sub rosa plan” doctrine.191 A sub rosa plan is a “de 
facto plan of reorganization, which enables a debtor to restructure its 
debt while bypassing many of the Bankruptcy Code’s fundamental 
creditor protections.”192 
The sub rosa plan doctrine has been diluted over time because courts 
like those in the automaker cases believe that reorganizations can more 
efficiently be effectuated by a sale rather than a plan.193 Yet, earlier 
decisions—Justice Breyer relied on appellate court opinions from the 
early 1980s in the In re Braniff Airways, Inc.194 and In re Lionel Corp.195 
bankruptcies—had worried that these sales could threaten the procedural 
protections of plans. In Braniff, the Fifth Circuit struck down a proposed 
sale of the debtor mid-way through the case that sought (1) to require 
                                                     
suppress”), with Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 531, 532 (2009) (arguing that automaker bankruptcies “are entirely within the 
mainstream of chapter 11 practice for the last decade”).  
189. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 986 (2017) (citing In re 
Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 118 (“[A]pproving a § 363 asset sale because the bankruptcy court 
demonstrated ‘proper solicitude for the priority between creditors and deemed it essential that the 
[s]ale in no way upset that priority.’”)).  
190. Id. 
191. Id. (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re 
Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983) (prohibiting an attempt to “short circuit 
the requirements of Chapter 11 for confirmation of a reorganization plan by establishing the terms 
of the plan sub rosa in connection with a sale of assets”)); Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel 
Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983) (reversing a Bankruptcy Court’s 
approval of an asset sale after holding that section 363 does not “grant[] the bankruptcy judge carte 
blanche” or “swallow[] up Chapter 11’s safeguards”).  
192. Del. Tr. Co. v. Energy Future Intermediate Holdings, LLC (In re Energy Future Holding 
Corp.), 527 B.R. 157, 168 (D. Del. 2015) (citing In re Marvel Entm’t Grp., Inc., 222 B.R. 243, 251 
(D. Del. 1998)), aff’d sub nom. In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 648 F. App’x 277 (3d Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 447 (2016) (mem.); see also In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 
118. 
193. See In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 118 (“Bankruptcy Judge Gonzalez found good business 
reasons for the Sale. The linchpin of his analysis was that the only possible alternative to the Sale 
was an immediate liquidation that would yield far less for the estate—and for the objectors.”). 
194. 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1983). 
195. 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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creditors to vote in favor of any future plan of reorganization supported 
by a majority of the official unsecured creditors’ committee; (2) to 
release the claims of all parties against the debtor, its secured creditors, 
and its officers and directors; and (3) to dictate certain economic terms 
of a future plan.196 In Lionel, the Second Circuit did much the same, 
under similar circumstances, holding that a sale of a business as a going 
concern should occur under a plan, rather than through an earlier sale, 
absent emergency circumstances.197 
Braniff and Lionel are vintage opinions, predating the rise of routine 
all-assets sales. In the past twenty years, courts appear to have become 
more comfortable with the expanding domain of reorganization-by-sale. 
This entails a shrinking role for plans.198 A sale would, under post-
Braniff/Lionel precedent, offend the sub rosa plan doctrine only if it “has 
the effect of dictating the terms of a prospective chapter 11 plan.”199 To 
be found to dictate the terms of a plan, the action “must either (i) dispose 
of all claims against the estate or (ii) restrict creditors’ rights to vote.”200 
The structured dismissal in Jevic would appear to have flunked either 
the old or new versions of the sub rosa plan doctrine. As a practical 
matter, its “structure” would have disposed of all claims against the 
debtor because, as noted above, it distributed all assets of the debtors 
(cash) in the stipulated order of priority. It left behind a judgment-proof 
shell. And, because creditors have no vote on a structured dismissal, and 
no plan was to follow, it would have “restricted” the right to vote. 
Moreover, as in Braniff, the Jevic dismissal sought to eliminate 
creditors’ ability to pursue those who may have harmed them or to 
negotiate different economic terms in the event a plan was ultimately 
proposed. To have approved the structured dismissal in Jevic would 
have been to virtually eliminate the last vestiges of the sub rosa plan 
doctrine. 
                                                     
196. In re Braniff Airways, 700 F.2d at 940 (“The debtor and the Bankruptcy Court should not be 
able to short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for confirmation of a reorganization plan by 
establishing the terms of the plan sub rosa in connection with the sale of assets. . . . In any future 
attempts to specify the terms whereby a reorganization plan is to be adopted, the parties and the 
district court must scale the hurdles erected in Chapter 11.”). 
197. See In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1063. 
198. See, e.g., In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 116 (approving all-assets sale but noting concerns about 
effect on plan-process protections); In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 497 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2009); J. Seth Moore & Vincent P. Slusher, Bankruptcy Code Section 363 Sales: Trends and 
Opportunities, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Sept. 2007, at 6, 9–10 (observing that “[t]he oversight 
and review of a § 363 sale is less than that of a plan confirmation because courts apply the 
amorphous and sometimes weak ‘business judgment’ standard to § 363 sales”). 
199. In re Capmark Fin. Grp., Inc., 438 B.R. 471, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010). 
200. Id. 
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Jevic did not forbid all-assets sales, however, or even hold that it was 
resurrecting the “old” version of the sub rosa plan doctrine. Rather, it 
may have been tending to unfinished business from the automaker 
bankruptcies. Objecting bondholders in Chrysler went all the way to the 
Supreme Court, after losing at every stage, including the Second Circuit. 
On a petition for certiorari they technically won: the Supreme Court 
vacated and remanded the case to the Second Circuit, without issuing a 
substantive opinion.201 But by then it was a hollow victory, as the sale 
was already consummated and the appeal was moot.202 
We can infer from Jevic that the majority understood that plans and 
their participatory mechanisms have value in the process which should 
not be abandoned lightly, even when corporate debtors are sold outside a 
plan. The Court’s hurried treatment of Chrysler had left this question 
open because the sales there rendered the contours of a plan a fait 
accompli. The Jevic majority seems to be saying that even if we believe 
all-assets sales maximize value in Chapter 11, we cannot conclude the 
process by making final distributions without a plan or, absent a plan, 
“consent” or, absent consent, the more rigid absolute priority rule. 
Jevic affirmed the participatory demands of plans by making clear 
that “consent” is the only exception to the Bankruptcy Code’s priority 
structure in final distributions. Congress carefully and deliberately 
developed the procedural protections of plans in order to provide some 
assurance of consent to deviations from absolute priority. While consent 
outside a plan remains possible, it will for the reasons explained in Part 
II be difficult to show in many cases; judges should worry about false 
negatives (the absence of objections) as well as strategic dissents (e.g., 
grousing by those clearly out of the money). Plans are hardly perfect 
evidence of consent, but they provide a set of guardrails for those 
controlling the resolution of a Chapter 11 case. Jevic was the Court’s 
way of reminding participants in this process that they cannot drive 
through or around those guardrails. 
                                                     
201. Ind. State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009). 
202. The Chrysler Court told us virtually nothing about why it was reversing. The full opinion 
was a single paragraph: 
On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
Motion of Washington Legal Foundation, et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. 
Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot. 
Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. at 1087 (citing United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950)). 
Citing Munsingwear means that the lower court decisions in Chrysler should have no precedential 
effect. A vacatur under Munsingwear “deprive[s] the [lower court’s] opinion of precedential effect.” 
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 n.12 (1975). 
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2. Participation Through Bargaining and Markets 
Plans are not solely procedural mechanisms. In order to be confirmed, 
a plan must satisfy a number of substantive criteria that create 
opportunities for participation through bargaining and market processes. 
The “absolute priority rule” undergirding the Jevic opinion facilitates 
both. 
The APR developed as a response to perceived abuses in the federal 
equity receiverships of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These 
cases were the forerunners of the modern Chapter 11 case—and of the 
problem in Jevic. The Court in the earlier cases worried that senior 
creditors and junior stakeholders (shareholders) would collude to 
“squeeze out” the general unsecured creditors.203 In Jevic, the “middle” 
stakeholders being squeezed out were the drivers, due to their priority 
wage claims. 
Although the APR is largely viewed as a distributive principle, it also 
has important participatory effects because it can force (or induce) plan 
bargaining.204 Plans can be approved consensually, through sufficient 
supermajority class voting,205 or non-consensually, if a class dissents.206 
                                                     
203. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd firmly set out the absolute priority rule: 
[I]f purposely or unintentionally a single creditor was not paid, or provided for in the 
reorganization, [petitioner Boyd] could assert his superior rights against the subordinate 
interests of the old stockholders in the property transferred to the new company. They were in 
the position of insolvent debtors who could not reserve an interest as against creditors. Their 
original contribution to the capital stock was subject to the payment of debts. The property was 
a trust fund charged primarily with the payment of corporate liabilities. Any device, whether by 
private contract or judicial sale under consent decree, whereby stockholders were preferred 
before the creditor, was invalid. Being bound for the debts, the purchase of their property by 
their new company for their benefit, put the stockholders in the position of a mortgagor buying 
at his own sale. If they did so in good faith and in ignorance of Boyd’s claim, they were none 
the less bound to recognize his superior right in the property, when, years later, his contingent 
claim was liquidated and established. That such a sale would be void, even in the absence of 
fraud in the decree, appears from the reasoning in Louisville Trust Co. . . . . 
228 U.S. 482, 504–05 (1913) (citing Louisville Tr. Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chi. Ry. Co., 
174 U.S. 674, 683 (1899)). 
204. As Douglas Baird puts it: 
Whether a group consents depends on its rights under the plan versus the rights it would have if 
it refused to go along with the plan. The absolute priority rule is central to the law of corporate 
reorganizations because it is the source of substantive rights as well as the procedural 
protections that each participant in a reorganization enjoys. Parties can insist that the priority 
rights they enjoyed outside of bankruptcy be respected inside. Nevertheless, every junior party, 
including the shareholders, can invoke elaborate procedures before their rights are 
compromised. The absolute priority rule allows the senior parties to insist on full payment, but 
it also grants all junior parties those procedural protections necessary for a “just 
reorganization.” Resolving this tension between substantive and procedural rights that began 
with Boyd remains central to answering the hard questions that arise under Chapter 11. 
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 86 (4th ed. 2006). See generally id. at 225–
82. 
205. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2012). 
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In the event of dissent, section 1129(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code 
requires a court to impose absolute priority because it may only approve 
the plan if it does not “discriminate unfairly” and is “fair and 
equitable.”207 “Fair and equitable” means that if a class of unsecured 
creditors dissents, the plan may be confirmed if the dissenters are paid in 
full, or junior claimants’ rights (e.g., shareholdings) are eliminated.208 
Shareholders might, given this threat, walk away. But if they believe 
there is a brighter future for the debtor, they might not. Rather than lose 
their stake, junior claimants (equity) may protect their interest under the 
so-called “new value corollary.”209 A “new value” plan may be approved 
over a dissenting class vote, and junior stakeholders may retain an 
interest in the debtor, if they provide “new value” commensurate with 
the stake they retain. That is, if they “make a fresh contribution [they 
may] receive in return a participation reasonably equivalent to their 
contribution.”210 
The “new value” corollary may sound like a cockeyed bargain: why 
should creditors care if shareholders are wiped out? But it has the effect 
of forcing those most likely in historic control of the debtor 
(shareholders) either to propose a plan that in fact induces widespread 
support or to give up their junior stake. Chapter 11 practice sees this as a 
                                                     
206. Id. § 1129(b). 
207. Id. Section 1129(b)(1) prohibits “unfair discrimination,” which “assures fair treatment 
among classes of the same priority level.” See In re SunEdison, Inc., 575 B.R. 220, 226 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
208. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (permitting cramdown where “the holder of any claim or 
interest that is junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account 
of such junior claim or interest any property”). See generally Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Assoc. 
v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 441–42 (1999).  
209. Case v. L.A. Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 118 (1939), suggested that the objection of 
an impaired senior class does not bar junior claim holders from receiving or retaining property 
interests in the debtor after reorganization, if they contribute new capital in money or money’s 
worth, reasonably equivalent to the property’s value, and necessary for successful reorganization of 
the restructured enterprise. 
It is, of course, clear that there are circumstances under which stockholders may participate in a 
plan of reorganization of an insolvent debtor. . . . Where th[e] necessity [for new capital] exists 
and the old stockholders make a fresh contribution and receive in return a participation 
reasonably equivalent to their contribution, no objection can be made. . . . [W]e believe that to 
accord “the creditor his full right of priority against the corporate assets” where the debtor is 
insolvent, the stockholder’s participation must be based on a contribution in money or in 
money’s worth, reasonably equivalent in view of all the circumstances to the participation of 
the stockholder.  
Id. at 121–22. It is worth noting that the Court has never affirmatively held that the new value 
corollary does (or does not) exist. See LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 443 (“We do not decide whether the 
statute includes a new value corollary or exception, but hold that on any reading respondent’s 
proposed plan fails to satisfy the statute, and accordingly reverse.”). 
210. Case, 308 U.S. at 121. 
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bargaining opportunity: precisely because there may be (residual) going 
concern value that shareholders wish to preserve, they are likely to 
negotiate a plan attractive enough to unsecured creditors to obtain 
affirmative support sufficient to avoid cramdown. 
But all of this glosses over difficult practical questions, in particular 
how much should the shareholders pay, and how do we figure that out? 
Consistent with Jevic, the Court has chosen a priority-enforcing rule that 
has important participatory implications, through the use of markets, 
which, in theory, reduce risks of seriously erroneous judicial valuations. 
In Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North 
LaSalle Street Partnership,211 the Court’s last major foray into Chapter 
11 jurisprudence before Jevic, Justice Souter held that valuation for 
these purposes must include market exposure—and not (only) judicial 
valuation.212 Justice Souter’s opinion there noted that when Congress 
drafted the current Bankruptcy Code, it deliberately reduced the role of 
judges in making valuation determinations in order to induce greater 
market participation.213 There are alternatives to market-derived 
valuations, such as expert testimony, which can inform how much a 
judge thinks junior stakeholders should pay. Yet, there is a strongly held 
view that market exposure tends to be a superior institutional choice 
because it promises broader participation.214 As conceived by LaSalle, 
the new value corollary would also tend to induce bargaining amongst 
the parties: if shareholders did not like the prospect of market 
competition, they would have to pony up enough to obtain creditors’ 
consent, through an affirmative plan vote.215 
                                                     
211. 526 U.S. 434 (1999). 
212. Id. at 454 (the plan in LaSalle was “doomed . . . by its provision for vesting equity in the 
reorganized business in the Debtor’s partners without extending an opportunity to anyone else either 
to compete for that equity or to propose a competing reorganization plan”).  
213. Id. at 457 (“[O]ne of the Code’s innovations [was] to narrow the occasions for courts to 
make valuation judgments, as shown by its preference for the supramajoritarian [sic] class creditor 
voting scheme in § 1126(c) . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
214. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 221 n.4 (4th ed. 1992) (“It is the 
superiority of the market to the courts in determining subjective values that provides the major 
reason for the law’s seeking to channel resource allocation through the market wherever possible.”). 
215. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 458 n.28 (“Congress adopted the view that creditors and equity security 
holders are very often better judges of the debtor’s economic viability and their own economic self-
interest than courts, trustees, or the SEC . . . . Consistent with this new approach, the Chapter 11 
process relies on creditors and equity holders to engage in negotiations toward resolution of their 
interests.” (quoting G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., Mike Sigal & William H. Schorling, Review of the 
Proposals of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission Pertaining to Business Bankruptcies: 
Part One, 53 BUS. LAW. 1381, 1406 n.136 (1998))). 
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All of these forms of participation—through the vote, the market, and 
the negotiated deal—were threatened by the structured dismissal in 
Jevic, because there would be no need or place for plans in a world 
where priority-skipping dismissals were permissible over objection. 
3. Participation Through Committees 
Bargaining is relatively easy in small groups. It becomes more 
difficult as the number of participants grows. As noted, large and 
medium-sized Chapter 11 cases can involve hundreds or thousands of 
stakeholders. This impedes direct bargaining, and instead requires 
representative participation, through “committees.” 
Section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “the United States 
trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured 
claims . . . . ordinarily consist[ing] of the persons, willing to serve, that 
hold the seven largest claims against the debtor of the kinds represented 
on such committee . . . .”216 “The concept of a creditors’ committee has 
great appeal,” Harner and Marincic observe.217 “It signifies 
representation and cooperation—key elements of most successful debt 
restructuring plans” because it “presents a potential solution to the 
collective action problem that often impairs debt restructuring 
efforts.”218 
But committees are imperfect representatives. They have no statutory 
mandate to bind unsecured creditors for most purposes.219 While they 
have standing to object to important matters in a case,220 there is no 
guarantee that they speak for all or even many creditors. In theory, the 
committee is supposed to represent creditors holding “representative” 
                                                     
216. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)–(b) (2012). 
217. Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical Analysis of the 
Role of Creditors’ Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 VAND. L. REV. 749, 756 (2011).  
218. Id. Courts have the discretion to appoint additional committees of junior stakeholders, such 
as shareholders or creditors holding special types of claims (e.g., tort claims if the debtor is a mass 
tortfeasor). 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2); In re Spansion, Inc., 421 B.R. 151, 156 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009); 
In re Dana Corp., 344 B.R. 35, 38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
219. Bussel & Klee, supra note 15, at 688 (“[T]he phenomenon of official creditors’ committees 
serving as proxies for unsecured creditors has developed entirely outside the statute itself and 
reinforces the power of self-pronounced ‘major parties.’ The statutory powers and duties of 
committees nowhere suggest that committee consent may bind its constituency; their statutory role 
is to investigate on behalf of, and to inform and advise constituents, not consent for them.” (citations 
omitted)). 
220. For example, the committee in Jevic could have objected to the structured dismissal there. 
Statutory committees have standing to support or oppose Rule 9019 settlement motions. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1109(b); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2018. 
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claims, which is a bit of a tautology.221 In Jevic, the petitioning truck 
drivers held both priority wage claims and general unsecured claims.222 
From a distributive perspective, committee members holding priority 
claims may have different incentives and risk-preferences than those 
who don’t. Moreover, in many small and medium-sized cases, 
committees may not be appointed at all.223 
As noted above,224 the ALI Principles indicate that representative 
consent may be acceptable where the representatives satisfy certain 
ethical criteria. While it is not clear whether, or to what extent, Chapter 
11 practice may include those or similar mechanisms, Jevic will likely 
heighten sensitivity to conflicts and underrepresentation that can impair 
participation in the reorganization process. Jevic can thus be seen as an 
invitation—or warning—to those who would participate on or represent 
(as counsel) creditors’ committees to take more seriously their obligation 
to ascertain and advocate the interests of all they purport to represent, or 
to find ethical ways to address underlying conflicts. Chapter 11’s 
committee structure was designed to promote this sort of participation, 
even as developments in Chapter 11 practice may have made it more 
challenging. 
4. The Price and Promise of Participation—Final Distributions 
Although Jevic affirms the role of stakeholder participation in 
Chapter 11 cases, there should be no illusions about its costs: 
participation in reorganization is a double-edged sword. It might sound 
good to say that stakeholders should participate in reorganization, 
through plans or consent. Yet, the response may be that there is already 
too much participation, and that the structured dismissal arose as a way 
to contain participation’s excessive costs. Some sophisticated 
creditors—especially distress investors fighting over the valuation of the 
debtor with senior creditors—participate actively. Many worry that this 
                                                     
221. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1). The statute merely requires that it “shall ordinarily consist of the 
persons, willing to serve, that hold the seven largest claims against the debtor of the kinds 
represented on such committee.” Id. 
222. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 981 (2017). 
223. Because creditors may be unwilling to serve, in most Chapter 11 cases no committee is 
appointed. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1102.02[1][a] (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 
16th ed. 2018); see also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure Under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99 (1983); Lynn M. LoPucki, The 
Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 247, 250 (1983). 
224. See supra section II.A.3. 
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participation can be a costly sideshow of little benefit to reorganizing 
debtors or their larger constituencies.225 
This, then, raises the question: why does participation matter in 
bankruptcy? Resolving corporate financial distress need not be 
participatory, and is not always so. For example, the bank failure regime 
in the United States is decidedly non-participatory.226 When banks fail, 
they cannot use the Chapter 11 system.227 Instead, they are seized 
without warning by their regulators and are liquidated or sold in short 
order.228 Creditors of the bank—in particular, individual depositors—do 
not participate in the process because participation in that context would 
likely be disastrous: bank runs, not workout negotiations, would 
ensue.229 But these sorts of panics are generally limited to banks, whose 
depositors—an important class of creditors—have little ability to 
coordinate amongst themselves or to negotiate with the bank. 
Chapter 11 is different because the expectation is that corporate 
stakeholders can or should be able to fend for themselves more 
effectively than retail bank depositors.230 This expectation reflects what 
may be a fairly efficient division of labor. The logic is that those in 
control of the debtor (presumptively managers, but also senior creditors, 
to an important extent) would have greater insight into how to maximize 
the value of assets than would stakeholders at large. Corporate debtors 
will often be managed in reorganization by “turnaround managers,” who 
have (or should have) expertise in value-maximization. While there are 
concerns about the influence that these managers can wield, there is little 
                                                     
225. Compare Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1609 
(2009), with Jared A. Ellias, The Shadowy Contours of Bankruptcy Resistant Investments, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 123 (2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2638901 [https://perma.cc/LYL3-
MZZM]. See also Heins v. Ruti-Sweetwarter, Inc. (In re Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc.), 836 F.2d 1263, 
1266 (10th Cir. 1988) (expressing concern about situations where “a creditor may sit idly by, not 
participate in any manner in the formulation and adoption of a [Chapter 11 plan] and thereafter, 
subsequent to the adoption of the plan, raise a challenge to the plan for the first time”).  
226. Jonathan C. Lipson, Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis of 
Financial Crises, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 673 (2015).  
227. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012) (defining who may be a debtor so as to exclude banks). 
228. See, e.g., Lipson, supra note 226, at 709 (“Under federal banking law, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or other designated regulator may seize a bank that is ‘critically 
undercapitalized,’ a minimum of two percent equity capital to total assets.”). 
229. Id. at 711 (discussing participatory problems with bank failure regime, and observing that 
“[w]hile courts certainly could supervise bank failures—and do so in many nations—there are 
sound institutional reasons for leaving that choice with government”). 
230. There are, of course, other institutional reasons for the difference in treatment as well, 
including that banks are thought to perform a special function in the economy. Id. 
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doubt that they would know more about how to make the most of a 
debtor’s assets than would general unsecured creditors. 
The same cannot be said for final distributions. Insiders will not have 
greater expertise about how the consideration received in the sale should 
be distributed to the debtor’s full body of stakeholders. Indeed, self-
interest would make it hard for those insiders to maximize distributions 
to others, even as it may spur them to maximize asset value. 
Participation by all stakeholders in that latter decision—through a plan 
or consent to a structured dismissal or absolute priority—would seem to 
be the best way to prevent the expropriation likely to occur when a small 
group of insiders gets to decide what a large group of outsiders receives. 
The structured dismissal approved by the lower courts in Jevic would 
have impaired this division of participatory labor by vesting in insiders 
the power to control both pre-plan sales (asset-value maximization) and 
final distributions. It would have neutralized the last vestige of creditor 
participation in the reorganization process over the things that, 
functionally, matter the most to them: how they actually get paid (if at 
all). 
B. Predictability and Procedural Integrity 
While participation may be the most complex and important process 
value that Jevic advances, the majority opinion was also motivated by 
concerns about predictability and procedural integrity. To take these 
concerns seriously is to see that they also advance goals of responsible 
participation needed to induce consent. 
1. Predictability 
Predictability is at once an obvious process value in our legal system 
and yet especially challenging in the “unruly”231 world of corporate 
reorganization. It is a core goal of our legal system—the premise and 
perhaps the product of stare decisis in common law adjudication.232 As 
                                                     
231. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 649 (2012) (noting 
the importance of clarity and predictability in light of the fact that the “Bankruptcy Code 
standardizes an expansive (and sometimes unruly) area of law”). 
232. Stare decisis derives from the maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means “to 
abide by the precedents and not to disturb settled points.” 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.01[1] (3d ed. 2017). Stare decisis is settled precedent that “reaches its 
apogee when a single precedent is considered to be a ‘binding’ authority.” Marla Brooke Tusk, No-
Citation Rules as a Prior Restraint on Attorney Speech, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1202, 1206 (2003) 
(quoting Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 29 (1959)). 
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Michael Van Alstine recently observed, “[v]ertical stare 
decisis . . . serves the core values of system stability and predictability, 
for it is by this means that the precedents of superior courts have 
practical effect through mandatory adherence by inferior courts 
throughout the system.”233 Like other courts, bankruptcy courts express a 
strong appreciation for the virtues of stare decisis234 and the 
predictability that that principle provides.235 
The majority opinion in Jevic promoted predictability in two ways. 
First, being a static structure, the absolute priority rule likely reduces 
resolution costs in large and medium-sized bankruptcy cases. For many 
observers, the rigidity of the APR promotes ex ante investment because 
creditors know, beforehand, where they will stand in relation to one 
another (and the debtor’s shareholders) if the debtor fails.236 This is 
plausible. But, it also has ex post efficiency benefits, precisely because it 
is a simpler framework in which to bargain to the endgame after 
default.237 This has a strong intuitive appeal, because a more narrowly 
tailored range of potential outcomes should usually make it easier to 
bargain. 
Good lawyers—especially those who work in an environment like 
Chapter 11, where bargaining is a key form of participation—understand 
that expectations about final period play influence that which comes 
                                                     
233. Michael P. Van Alstine, Stare Decisis and Foreign Affairs, 61 DUKE L.J. 941, 963 (2012). 
234. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 504 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). Judge Gerber 
said the following: 
This Court follows the decisions of its fellow bankruptcy judges in this district, in the absence 
of plain error, because the interests of predictability in commercial bankruptcy cases are of 
such great importance. Apart from the underlying reasons that have caused stare decisis to be 
embedded in American decisional law, stare decisis is particularly important in commercial 
bankruptcy cases because of the expense and trauma of any commercial bankruptcy, and the 
need to deal with foreseeable events, by pre-bankruptcy planning, to the extent they can be 
addressed. 
Id. 
235. See, e.g., In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 359 B.R. 65, 72 n.13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(“This Court has been on record for many years as having held that the interests of predictability in 
this District are of great importance . . . .”). 
236. Roe & Tung, supra note 12, at 1236 (“The absolute priority rule provides the fixed 
framework within which the players negotiate the plan of reorganization and within which the judge 
evaluates it.”); see also Adler, supra note 12, at 214 (“Anticipation of breaches in absolute priority 
can raise a firm’s ex ante cost of capital.”).  
237. Roe & Tung, supra note 12, at 1279 (observing that in some cases under the APR, “the 
resulting transactional, doctrinal, and legislative structures are more efficient and fair than what they 
replace”); see also Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in 
Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 513 (2009) (noting intercreditor conflict is common and 
“distorts outcomes in bankruptcy cases”).  
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before.238 It is, for example, well understood that the “shadow” cast by 
different resolution standards affects the bargaining over whether to 
settle or try a case.239 At least as a general proposition, the greater the 
uncertainty, the greater the likelihood of protracted litigation.240 
So, too, in corporate reorganization. While adjudication of a “non-
consensual” plan is not a trial in a traditional sense,241 the shadow cast 
by the rules that govern final distributions absent consent to an 
alternative will necessarily affect the participation that occurs before the 
final distributions are made. If parties understand that the endgame will 
be either consent or absolute priority, they will bargain in one way. If, 
instead, they know that the endgame permits priority (and perhaps other) 
deviations via structured dismissals that are unpredictable ex ante, they 
will bargain differently. Although reasonable minds might differ about 
this, it would appear that uncertainty increases the risks of strategic 
litigation and expropriation. Because absolute priority is axiomatically 
more certain than relative priority, it would appear to be a less costly 
default rule. 
Second, the Jevic majority appears to have been skeptical that the 
deviation approved by the courts below could be limited to “rare” cases 
                                                     
238. In re Alpha Nat. Res., Inc., 546 B.R. 348, 358 (Bankr. E.D. Va.) (“The [management 
retention plan] ensures that the Debtors maintain a keen focus on the Chapter 11 end-game, by 
making a significant part of the bonus pool contingent on confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization.”), aff’d sub nom. United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension Plan & Tr. v. Alpha 
Nat. Res., Inc., 553 B.R. 556 (E.D. Va. 2016); Ingrid C. Palermo, The Changing Face of 
Bankruptcy Law, 2014 WL 788389, at *4 (“If you file for Chapter 11 but do not have an end-game 
strategy, you are doomed to fail.”).  
239. See, e.g., Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of 
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to 
No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 
320 (1991); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of 
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection 
Hypothesis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215 (1985). 
240. This is most commonly captured in the view that trials in traditional litigation represent 
predictive errors. Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes 
and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067, 1074 (1989) (trials result from “mistaken 
prediction[s]” made by parties). See generally Priest & Klein, supra note 239, at 16 (suggesting that 
“more uncertainty as to . . . outcomes” produces “more disagreement between the parties”). Cf. 
Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256, 275 
(1995) (arguing that the uncertainty of incomplete entitlements can lead to efficient bargaining 
outcomes). 
241. But there will be a “trial” in a functional sense. See, e.g., In re Tex. Rangers Baseball 
Partners, No. 10-43400 (DML), 2010 WL 4106713, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2010) 
(observing that plan is confirmed under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as made 
applicable by Bankruptcy Rules 7052 and 9014, governing “contested matters”). 
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because Jevic, itself, was not a rare case. The Third Circuit majority had 
reasoned that priority-skipping final distributions may be approved “in a 
rare case,”242 if the bankruptcy court has “specific and credible grounds 
to justify [the] deviation.”243 The Court rejected this, noting that it was 
“difficult to give precise content to the concept ‘sufficient reasons’” to 
justify a priority deviation at the end of a case.244 “That fact,” the 
majority observed, “threatens to turn a ‘rare case’ exception into a more 
general rule.”245 
The Court rejected the claim that there could be no resolution without 
skipping the drivers’ claims, or even that the distributions approved by 
the lower courts “would make some creditors (high- and low-priority 
creditors) better off without making other (mid-priority) creditors worse 
off (for they would receive nothing regardless).”246 If there was, in fact, 
nothing rare about this case, the majority reasoned, “one can readily 
imagine other cases that turn on comparably dubious predictions. The 
result is uncertainty. And uncertainty will lead to similar claims being 
made in many, not just a few, cases.”247 Practice under Chapter 11 is 
replete with stories of ostensibly “rare” departures from a statutory 
standard becoming the norm.248 Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, 
was right to worry about the slippery slope of Jevic’s structured 
dismissal. 
Yet, predictability can be problematic in bankruptcy for a variety of 
reasons. The resource constraints that lead to bankruptcy do not vanish 
once a company commences a case, even as it may temporarily be 
                                                     
242. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding 
Corp.), 787 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 
U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017). 
243. Id. at 184 (quoting Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium 
Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 466 (2d Cir. 2007)) (alteration in original). Judge Scirica’s dissent 
in the opinion below was also appropriately skeptical. 
It is not unusual for a debtor to enter bankruptcy with liens on all assets, nor is it unusual for a 
debtor to enter Chapter 11 proceedings . . . with the goal of liquidating . . . . It is also not 
difficult to imagine another secured creditor who wants to avoid providing funds to priority 
unsecured creditors . . . . 
Id. at 189–90 (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
244. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 986. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. (observing that “the record provides equivocal support” for the lower courts’ predictions 
about resolution absent the structured dismissal approved below). 
247. Id. (“[O]nce the floodgates are opened, debtors and favored creditors can be expected to 
make every case that ‘rare case.’” (quoting Frederick F. Rudzik, A Priority Is a Priority Is a 
Priority—Except When It Isn’t, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2015, at 16, 79)). 
248. As discussed in section IV.B, infra, “superpriority” debtor in possession financing was 
meant to be rare but is now commonplace. 
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protected from collection litigation. Congress made Chapter 11 flexible 
to give parties and judges leeway to craft and recognize creative, 
negotiated resolutions.249 Flexibility entails discretion, which, in turn, 
permits (and perhaps promotes) uncertainty. While the Court has sought 
to cabin the discretion of bankruptcy judges,250 Chapter 11 gives them 
significant powers over the corporate debtors that appear before them. 
Observers worry that this discretion may contribute to capture of the 
bankruptcy bench by the bankruptcy bar. Lynn LoPucki, for example, 
has argued that the bankruptcy bench and bar in Delaware and New 
York have been corrupted by the desire to run big Chapter 11 cases in 
those venues.251 Although the structured dismissal is not limited to use 
there, Jevic did come out of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Delaware, which is the nation’s busiest Chapter 11 court. That court 
appears to have been highly receptive to innovations like structured 
dismissals that may seem appropriate in a given case, but that can over 
time expand to tolerate normative outcomes that defy both the will of 
Congress and the participatory goals of Chapter 11. 
2. Procedural Integrity 
Concerns about the unruly nature of bankruptcy courts also inform the 
Court’s views in Jevic about integrity in the Chapter 11 process, 
generally. Integrity has special resonance for bankruptcy practice, which 
has at times been caricatured as little more than a “ring” of parasites 
gnawing away at the carcass of the failed debtor.252 
Today, notwithstanding provocative claims to the contrary, there is 
little direct evidence of that sort of collusion. Instead, dominant parties 
in Chapter 11 cases may enter into agreements, like the structured 
dismissal in Jevic. Such agreements have the potential to defy 
mandatory and well-justified rules, including those on absolute priority, 
                                                     
249. See Lipson, supra note 225, at 1654 (observing that designed Chapter 11 bankruptcy “to be 
highly flexible, to permit the reorganization of small, local firms as well as very large public 
companies”). 
250. See Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1196 (2014) (“The Code’s meticulous—not 
to say mind-numbingly detailed—enumeration of exemptions and exceptions to those exemptions 
confirms that courts are not authorized to create additional exceptions.”). 
251. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS 
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005).  
252. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 6011 (1977) (describing the “unseemly and continuing 
relationship” under pre-Code practice among bar and judges as a “bankruptcy ring”); Laura Napoli 
Coordes, The Geography of Bankruptcy, 68 VAND. L. REV. 381, 439 (2015). 
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designed to protect those who, for whatever reasons, do not participate 
in the deal.253 
For the Jevic majority, sustaining the courts (and the deal) below 
risked promoting this sort of soft collusion in three ways. First, as the 
Court observed, approving this structured dismissal would invite junior 
and senior creditors to join forces in order to squeeze out those in the 
middle, as would have happened to the drivers in Jevic.254 This was, in 
form, the problem in the equity receiverships that both led to the 
formulation of the APR and to Congress’s basic approach to 
reorganization under Chapter 11. The guardrails of the plan process were 
designed, among other things, to prevent a recurrence of the abuses of 
the receiverships. 
Second, the structured dismissal would have released CIT and Sun 
from liability in connection with the LBO.255 This would have created 
even greater problems. Recall that they had been significantly 
responsible for the LBO, had presumably benefited from it, and were 
now seeking to use the structured dismissal to limit liability for the harm 
it allegedly caused. It would have been one thing had the drivers agreed 
to the settlement and release contained in the structured dismissal; then, 
Sun and CIT could legitimately say that the structured dismissal simply 
purchased peace for a price acceptable to all involved. But the drivers 
objected, and the bankruptcy court approved the release anyway. Even 
this may not have been problematic, if the drivers had been permitted to 
sue Sun and CIT in state court after the dismissal, given that state law 
apparently created a cause of action under New Jersey’s fraudulent 
transfer law. Instead, the dismissal took the extraordinary step of 
effectively barring the drivers from suing Sun and CIT outside 
bankruptcy court.256 
Although the Jevic majority did not focus on this, it is hard to 
overstate the danger the release created. Fraudulent transfer law may be 
one of the last checks on excessive lending in the acquisition context. It 
                                                     
253. See Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 444 
(1999) (discussing how the absolute priority rule was developed in response to “concern with ‘the 
ability of a few insiders, whether representatives of management or major creditors, to use the 
reorganization process to gain an unfair advantage’” (quoting H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 255 
(1973))). 
254. Structured dismissals like those in Jevic present “risks of collusion, i.e., senior secured 
creditors and general unsecured creditors teaming up to squeeze out priority unsecured creditors.” 
Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 987 (2017) (citing LaSalle, 526 
U.S. at 444). 
255. See discussion supra note 46. 
256. See discussion supra note 46. 
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says to investors such as Sun and lenders such as CIT that if an 
acquisition is too leveraged, and that leverage harms the debtor and its 
other creditors, they—the parties that struck and benefited from the 
deal—will be liable to the creditors harmed by it. If, instead, the Suns 
and CITs of the world know that they can use a structured dismissal to 
escape liability for deals that harm other stakeholders, they will have less 
reason to exercise restraint in those deals. It would invite collusion ex 
ante between the leveraged acquirers and sellers of businesses, who 
would know that they could easily disable an important deterrent to such 
deals through a structured dismissal. 
Third, Jevic recognizes that integrity requires respect for cost, and in 
particular the cost of bargaining to a consensual resolution.257 As noted 
above, the uncertainty introduced by deviations from the absolute 
priority rule, and the “rare case” exception crafted by the lower courts, 
would have invited more litigation to clarify—or exploit—this 
uncertainty. This would have driven up the cost of resolving Chapter 11 
cases after Jevic. While some distress professionals may benefit from 
such a state of affairs, those for whom the system exists would not. 
C. Jevic’s Assumption—Equity in the Estate 
Jevic’s procedural logic turns on a crucial assumption: that there is 
equity in the estate sufficient to fund a case and produce some return to 
stakeholders other than senior secured creditors; that is, that there are 
stakeholders who are “in the money.” Here, the drivers were in the 
money because the proceeds of the fraudulent transfer suit were property 
of the estate, and they were next in line to receive them, but for the 
structured dismissal. 
But this will not always be the case. Practitioners view the structured 
dismissal as especially appropriate where the debtor’s assets have been 
sold, leaving it with “no unsecured assets to administer or with 
insufficient unsecured assets to fund a confirmable plan.”258 It would not 
be difficult to apply absolute priority where a debtor has fully 
encumbered its assets: the senior secured creditor would take everything. 
That, then, begs a question: why bother with Chapter 11 reorganization 
and Jevic’s process values at all? What work does Jevic really do if, as 
                                                     
257. Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 987 (“And they include making settlement more difficult to achieve.” 
(citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 271 (1976))). 
258. Pernick & Dean, supra note 29, at 1, 58–59; see also In re Petersburg Regency LLC, 540 
B.R. 508, 531 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015) (approving structured dismissal over equity holders’ objection 
on grounds that there was no equity in assets).  
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explained in the next part, debtors fully encumber their assets prior to 
bankruptcy, such that it may be impossible to pay mid-priority or junior 
claimants under “ordinary” priority? 
IV. THE SECRET LIFE OF PRIORITY: PRIORITY AS PROCESS 
The answer, perhaps counterintuitive, is that Jevic’s process values—
participation, predictability, and procedural integrity—provide a basis 
for resisting the power that senior secured creditors seem often to 
exercise in reorganization. 
Priority lives a dual life. It is a substantive doctrine about the 
distribution of property, but it also has strong procedural effects.259 
Because senior creditors frequently do not actually want immediate 
liquidation shares of the property in which they have priority (because 
the value would be depressed), they have instead learned to use their 
leverage to obtain procedural power over the reorganization of distressed 
companies—that is, to fight for future value. Jevic’s logic demands an 
assessment of the procedural power that senior creditors have accrued 
and boundaries to manage that power. 
A. Priority as Process 
To some extent, senior creditors have long enjoyed procedural 
advantages over junior stakeholders. Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, for example, permits secured creditors to use self-
help to take personal property securing their loan, provided that they can 
do so without “breach of the peace.”260 Mortgagees use judicial 
processes to realize on their priority interest in real property over other 
competing claimants, such as unsecured creditors who may seek to 
establish judgment liens on the property. 
                                                     
259. Jay Westbrook was among the first to identify the distinct relationship between priority and 
process. See Westbrook, supra note 16, at 797 (arguing that “control of the bankruptcy process, 
rather than formal rules of security and priority, is the key to understanding both secured-credit and 
bankruptcy law: Control is the function of bankruptcy; priority is the end for which it is employed”). 
I recognize that this assumes a somewhat artificial distinction between “substantive” and 
“procedural” rules. Whether this distinction exists in the abstract is a question of jurisprudence 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
260. U.C.C. § 9-609 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). Of course, situations 
involving multiple layers of secured creditors present much more interesting and challenging 
situations than may concern us here. See, e.g., Frierson v. United Farm Agency, 868 F.2d 302, 305 
(8th Cir. 1989) (junior creditor who garnishes collateral takes subject to senior creditor’s security 
interest). 
05 - Lipson(2).docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018 9:21 PM 
686 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:631 
 
Indeed, senior creditors had so much power outside bankruptcy that 
Chapter 11 was conceived in important part as a way to level the playing 
field as among senior creditors, a debtor, and its junior stakeholders.261 
“The Chapter 11 process,” legislative history observed, “involves a 
system of checks and balances designed to protect and promote the 
interests of all the affected parties.”262 
In the past twenty-five years, however, senior secured credit has 
exploded as a financing tool,263 and senior creditors have learned how to 
use the power of their priority to usurp control of the process. Many 
observers worry that the growing power of senior creditors is the single 
greatest challenge to the efficiency and integrity of Chapter 11.264 An 
                                                     
261. As legislative history explains: 
[R]eorganization, in its fundamental aspects, involves the thankless task of determining who 
should share the losses incurred by an unsuccessful business and how the values of the estate 
should be apportioned among creditors and stockholders. In a large public company, whose 
interests are diverse and complex, the most vulnerable today are public investors who own 
subordinated debt or equity securities. The bill, like Chapter X, is designed to counteract the 
natural tendency of a debtor in distress to pacify large creditors, with whom the debtor would 
expect to do business, at the expense of small and scattered public investors. 
S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 10 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5796; see also Jay 
Lawrence Westbrook, Secured Creditor Control and Bankruptcy Sales: An Empirical View, 2015 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 831, 833 (“Traditionally, the various institutions of modern Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
produced a certain balance among the debtor and various creditor constituencies.”). 
262. A Bill to Amend Title 11, United States Code, The Bankruptcy Code, Regarding Benefits of 
Certain Retired Employees: Hearing on S. 548 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice 
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 154 (1987) (statement of Richard A. Gitlin, 
President, American Bankruptcy Institute). 
263. As long ago as 1994, Robert Scott observed: 
[A]sset-based [i.e., secured] financing has undergone an enormous transformation since the 
enactment of Article 9. The most vivid illustration of this is the dramatic increase in the 
number and size of firms that rely on secured credit as their principal means of financing both 
ongoing operations and growth opportunities. Previously, with a few exceptions (such as 
factoring and trust receipts), secured financing principally had served second-class markets as 
the “poor man’s” means of obtaining credit. Now, it has become the linchpin of private 
financing, prompting even large firms to employ leveraged buyouts as a means of fleeing 
public equity markets for the safe harbors of Article 9. When viewed in these terms, Article 9 
can only be seen as a blazing success. 
Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783, 1784–85 (1994). The rise of secured 
credit was significantly facilitated by the enactment of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
which was, in turn, importantly shaped by both scholars, such as Grant Gilmore, and scholar-
practitioners, such as Homer Kripke, who for much of his career was, coincidentally, with CIT. 
Grant Gilmore, Dedication to Professor Homer Kripke, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 9, 11 (1981). Kripke, 
like most advocates of that law, viewed it as means to advance distributive—not procedural—goals. 
“[T]he legal structure of secured credit developed to make possible mass production and the 
distribution of goods” which, he argued, “have increased human welfare.” Homer Kripke, Law and 
Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. 
PA. L. REV. 929, 931 n.14 (1985). 
264. Westbrook, supra note 261, at 833 (“Secured creditors have by far the most effective tools 
for upsetting that balance and obtaining control of Chapter 11 cases, converting the Debtor in 
Possession (‘DIP’) to a Secured Party in Possession.”); see also Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. 
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extensive report by the American Bankruptcy Institute recently warned 
that senior creditors use their priority rights to “increase their control 
over borrower cash and ultimately over a Chapter 11 filing.”265 Professor 
Tabb puts the point bluntly: “the entire reorganization is dependent on 
the good graces of the pre-bankruptcy controlling secured lender.”266 
Although Jevic involved priority, it was not directly about the power 
of senior creditors. Rather, it was about the status of mid-priority 
creditors, squeezed by the senior creditors and junior shareholders. But, 
as explained below, Jevic’s senior creditor, CIT, got to control the 
process from the beginning through terms approved by the bankruptcy 
court in a “super-priority” case-financing agreement. Senior creditors 
such as CIT use these agreements to control or strongly influence most 
of the succeeding decisions in the case, including whether, when, and 
how to sell assets. 
Structured dismissals may be especially attractive to senior creditors 
because they would provide control at the final stage—distributions. In 
other words, even before Jevic, senior creditors have often been able to 
control the beginning and middle of cases. But they could not control the 
end. The structured dismissal approved by the lower courts would have 
                                                     
Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 754–55 (2002) (describing a 
fundamental shift in Chapter 11 bankruptcy from a reorganization vehicle to a means of liquidation 
driven in large part by secured creditors who increasingly view the sales value of a firm’s current 
assets as greater than the going-concern value of those assets in the future); Brubaker & Tabb, supra 
note 16, at 104–05 (writing that fundamental changes in the financial world, including the growing 
power of secured creditors, have brought an end to traditional Chapter 11 reorganizations); Harvey 
R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 129, 131 (2005) (writing 
that creditors increasingly use bankruptcy to effectuate favorable asset sales with no attempt at 
reorganization); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in 
Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 919–20 (2003) (discussing a shift to increasing secured 
creditor control in Chapter 11 bankruptcy as a result of the debtor in possession financing provisions 
in section 364, which skew any incentive the DIP lender otherwise had in the creditor’s 
reorganization); Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Secured Party in Possession, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., Sept. 2003, at 12 (expressing concern about secured creditor control of the Chapter 11 
process); Westbrook, supra note 16, at 843–44 (describing the rise within Chapter 11 bankruptcy of 
the secured-party-in-possession: secured parties which are able to assert their Article 9 rights to 
payment, security, and control within the bankruptcy proceeding). 
265. ABI REPORT, supra note 7, at 215 n.784 (quoting ASM Field Hearing Before the ABI 
Comm’n to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, at 1–2 (Apr. 19, 2013) (statement of John Haggerty)).  
266. Tabb, supra note 30, at 768. The idea that senior creditors can assert control rights is not, 
itself, new. George Triantis was the first to discuss control rights and the way in which they inhere 
in debt instruments. See George G. Triantis, Debt Financing, Corporate Decision Making, and 
Security Design, 26 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 93, 100–02 (1996); George G. Triantis, The Interplay 
Between Liquidation and Reorganization in Bankruptcy: The Role of Screens, Gatekeepers, and 
Guillotines, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 101, 104–08 (1996). What is new, as explained below, is the 
extent to which senior creditors can use priority to capture control of the process, itself. 
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changed that. Vesting this much power in any single stakeholder in a 
Chapter 11 case would have magnified risks of expropriation and error. 
B. Case Financing—“Super Priority” DIP Lending 
Because the goal of Chapter 11 is the reorganization of troubled but 
viable going concerns, Congress recognized that operating debtors 
would need to use revenues from sales after commencement of the case. 
This might be a problem if a secured creditor’s lien extended to revenues 
earned after commencement of the case. However, the Bankruptcy Code 
makes clear that property acquired by a debtor post-petition is generally 
free from prepetition security interests.267 Post-petition earnings could, 
in theory, finance the case itself as well as the restructuring of the 
business and, ultimately, the Chapter 11 reorganization plan that would 
embody the “new deal” among the debtor and its stakeholders. 
In many Chapter 11 cases, however, a debtor’s revenues are 
inadequate to fund operations. The debtor will need post-petition debtor-
in-possession (DIP) financing to remain in business throughout the 
bankruptcy.268 Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code governs these 
transactions. If a debtor cannot obtain post-petition financing on an 
unsecured or administrative priority basis, “section 364(c) . . . permits a 
debtor to provide . . . a claim with a . . . superpriority.”269 This super-
priority places the holder ahead of all other priority claims.270 
Super-priority lending requires a showing of serious need by the 
debtor and procedural protections for junior claimants.271 It was meant to 
                                                     
267. For example, Bankruptcy Code section 552 limits the effectiveness of a secured creditor’s 
security interest in property a debtor acquires after it commences its case to “proceeds, products” 
and so on of prepetition collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012). In theory, property the DIP acquires 
post-petition that is not, itself, proceeds of prepetition collateral is available for the estate’s use, 
unencumbered. Congress observed that this approach was “designed, among other things, to prevent 
windfalls for secured creditors and to give the courts broad discretion to balance the protection of 
secured creditors, on the one hand, against the strong public policies favoring continuation of jobs, 
preservation of going concern values and rehabilitation of distressed debtors, generally.” 140 CONG. 
REC. H10, 768 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994); see also United Va. Bank v. Slab Fork Coal Co. (In re Slab 
Fork Coal Co.), 784 F.2d 1188, 1191 (4th Cir. 1986). 
268. Nicole Stephansen, Roll-Up Financing Gains Prominence, RESTRUCTURING REV., June 
2010, at 10, http://documents.lexology.com/2f2d4fb8-6839-49fd-a592-c8710bfab9a3.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/LY32-CMA5]. 
269. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 364(c). 
270. See Stephansen, supra note 268, at 10.  
271. In re Levitt & Sons, LLC, 384 B.R. 630, 640–41 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (“In the event the 
debtor is unable to obtain credit under the provisions of § 364(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor 
may obtain credit secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the estate that is already subject to 
a lien, commonly called a ‘priming lien.’”). “Such relief may be granted so long as (1) the debtor is 
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be the exception rather than the rule, a last-resort financing. That, 
however, is not how Chapter 11 practice has developed. Super-priority 
DIP financing is now common, even in cases that are clearly not 
intended to be reorganizations, but instead merely controlled 
liquidations, such as Jevic. 
Complicating matters is the fact that in some cases, the prebankruptcy 
senior lender will provide the post-petition DIP financing, and will ask 
that its prepetition claim be “rolled up” into the DIP loan.272 This has the 
practical effect of “converting the DIP lender’s (likely) undersecured 
pre-bankruptcy loan into a fully secured postpetition claim.”273 
Moreover, property that the debtor might acquire post-petition would 
“cross-collateralize” the prepetition loan, further enhancing the senior 
creditor’s security, even though those assets were meant to be available 
to the estate unencumbered. 
Courts historically worried about the leverage roll-ups would give 
prebankruptcy lenders.274 Today, however, they appear to be 
commonplace.275 The concern is that lenders like CIT in Jevic can 
bargain for a roll-up because they can make it difficult for the debtor to 
shop elsewhere for a loan. If, for example, the prebankruptcy lender 
learns that a troubled debtor is attempting to negotiate for DIP financing 
as part of its bankruptcy planning, the secured creditor may not 
cooperate with other potential lenders or declare a default, forcing the 
debtor to commence a Chapter 11 case before it is ready to do so. 
Because corporate debtors’ assets are often fully encumbered, their 
lender’s prebankruptcy priority will give them leverage to become the 
only lender—and thus the lender under a priority-enhancing DIP loan. 
This may seem counterintuitive, for two reasons: (1) why would the 
prebankruptcy lender want to lend more to a troubled company? and (2) 
                                                     
unable to obtain financing in any other permissible manner and (2) there is adequate protection of 
the interests of the holder of the lien on the property on which the senior lien is proposed to be 
granted.” Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1)). 
272. Lipson, supra note 114, at 252 (discussing development of roll-ups). 
273. Roe & Tung, supra note 12, at 1251.  
274. Otte v. Mfrs. Hanover Commercial Corp. (In re Texlon Corp.), 596 F.2d 1092, 1098 (2d Cir. 
1979) (disapproving cross-collateralization in that case but declining to forbid it per se); see also 
Charles J. Tabb, A Critical Reappraisal of Cross-Collateralization in Bankruptcy, 60 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 109, 115 (1986). 
275. See Marcia L. Goldstein, Debtor in Possession Financing: Recommendations and 
Rebalancing, in AM. BANKR. INST., DIP FINANCING, PRE-CONFIRMATION SALES AND OUT-OF-
COURT RESTRUCTURINGS (2015) (“A debtor’s prepetition secured lenders are often the only party 
willing to provide DIP financing. In fact, postpetition lenders have been the debtor’s prepetition 
secured lenders in many of the major Chapter 11 cases filed over recent years.”); Lipson, supra note 
114, at 252–56 (discussing roll-up in Colt bankruptcy). 
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why would those who manage that company want to borrow on onerous 
terms? The answer to the first is that Chapter 11 adds value that other 
resolutions do not by providing a single forum and the preemptive power 
of federal bankruptcy law to resolve the debtor’s distress.276 Controlling 
the process assures the senior creditor of this value. The answer to the 
second is more complex and likely reflects the fact that in many cases, 
including Jevic, “turnaround” managers will have been appointed to 
oversee the reorganization. For whom these managers actually act is not 
entirely clear, but a cause for some concern. They may not act as 
fiduciaries for the debtor’s residual claimants, in particular unsecured 
creditors, as doctrine requires.277 Instead, relational theory predicts that 
they may have greater loyalty to those whose relationships matter to 
them, such as those with who control the debtor’s purse.278 
The DIP loan in Jevic is a textbook example of the latter concern. 
When the Jevic debtors filed their Chapter 11 petition on May 20, 2008 
(the “petition date”), they asked the Bankruptcy Court to approve an 
“emergency” $60 million loan from their prebankruptcy lender, CIT, on 
a super-priority basis.279 Although the stated “emergency” was the need 
to pay drivers to complete their routes,280 the bulk of the loan was 
apparently used by CIT to repay itself.281 Under the DIP loan, CIT 
                                                     
276. See generally Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price 
of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 870 (2014) (discussing the value added 
by Chapter 11 reorganization). 
277. Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially 
Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2003) (“It has become commonplace—
perhaps trite—to observe that once a corporation is in financial distress, duties of care and loyalty 
that ordinarily run solely to or for the benefit of shareholders ‘shift’ to corporate creditors.”). 
278. Lipson, supra note 114, at 278 (discussing “turnaround managers” who may be appointed to 
run the corporate debtor in chapter 11 and their loyalties). 
279. DIP Motion, supra note 32, ¶¶ 26–27. The debtors also sought when they commenced the 
case to appoint a “chief restructuring officer.” See Order Granting Motion of Debtors Pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. Section 363 for Entry of an Order Approving the Retention of Morris Anderson & 
Associates Ltd. & Designating Daniel Dooley as Chief Restructuring Officer Nunc Pro Tunc to the 
Petition Date, In re Jevic Holding Corp., No. 08-01106 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. June 20, 2008). 
280. According to the final order approving the financing, there was “[a]n immediate and critical 
need . . . for the Debtors to . . . obtain secured financing in order to manage the wind-down of the 
Debtor’s business, attempt to deliver all of the freight in their system, retrieve their assets and 
effectuate a prompt and orderly liquidation of their assets and proceed towards a confirmable plan.” 
Final Order (I) Authorizing Debtors-in-Possession to Obtain Senior Debtor-in-Possession 
Financing; (II) Granting Liens, Security Interests, & Superpriority Status; (III) Authorizing Use of 
Cash Collateral; & (IV) Affording Adequate Protection to Prepetition Lenders ¶ 9, In re Jevic 
Holding Corp., No. 08-01106 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. June 20, 2008) [hereinafter Final DIP Order]. 
281. Id. ¶ 43. (“[T]o the extent that the debtors obtain full and final approval of the Senior DIP 
Financing at the Final Hearing and the conditions precedent under the Senior DIP Credit Agreement 
to the availability of the Senior DIP Financing are satisfied or waived, then, within two business 
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would have super-priority in the debtor’s assets, whether acquired before 
or during bankruptcy. The DIP loan—a rollup used to pay the senior 
creditor in a controlled liquidation—challenges the values of 
participation, predictability, and procedural integrity that the Supreme 
Court vindicated in striking the structured dismissal of the case. 
1. Participation and the Jevic DIP Financing 
The DIP financing in Jevic constricted participation in a variety of 
problematic ways. The first involved the process—or lack of process—
leading to the DIP loan, itself. In Jevic, the request for financing was 
made on an emergency basis on the day the debtor commenced its case. 
The Bankruptcy Court approved it on an interim basis at a hearing two 
days later, and gave its final approval one month after the case was 
commenced, June 20, 2008.282 When the motion was initially made, 
there was no official committee of unsecured creditors to represent 
Jevic’s estimated 5,000–10,000 unsecured creditors. That group was not 
appointed until June 4, 2008,283 about two weeks after the interim 
financing was approved, and two weeks before the final financing order 
was entered on June 20, 2008. It appears from the docket that neither the 
creditors’ committee nor the United States Trustee formally objected to 
the DIP financing.284 
As a practical matter, therefore, other stakeholders of the debtors had 
little opportunity to scrutinize either the proposed DIP loan or the 
prepetition loan that was rolled-up into it. So, for example, there is no 
evidence that any party tested the debtor’s efforts to shop for other loans 
                                                     
days after the entry of the Final Order, the Debtors shall repay the Prepetition Lenders the then 
remaining unpaid principal amount of the Prepetition Financing, any accrued but unpaid interest (at 
the non-default rate), and reasonable professional fees and disbursements . . . .”). Thus, the loan was 
used to pay CIT long before there was any judicial determination on its allowability. Id.; see also id. 
at Exhibit A (budget for application of DIP loan proceeds). 
282. See Final DIP Order, supra note 280. 
283. See Notice of Appointment of Committee of Unsecured Creditors, In re Jevic Holding 
Corp., No. 08-11006 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. June 4, 2008). 
284. The docket reveals only one limited objection to the DIP Financing, from Central Freight, 
which alleged that about $350,000 in cash held by the debtors was “in trust” for Central Freight, and 
so could not be subject to CIT’s lien. Limited Objection of Central Freight Lines, Inc. to Emergency 
Motion for Final Order (I) Authorizing Debtors-In-Possession to Enter into Senior Debtor-In-
Possession Credit Agreement & Obtain Postpetition Financing Pursuant to Sections 363 & 364 of 
the Bankruptcy Code; (II) Granting Liens, Security Interests & Superpriority Claims; (III) 
Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral; (IV) Affording Adequate Protection to Prepetition Lenders; 
& (V) Providing for the Payment of Secured Prepetition Indebtedness, In re Jevic Holding Corp., 
No. 08-11006 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. June 5, 2008). 
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or better terms.285 While the debtor may have needed funding to 
complete deliveries in transit, it is not clear why CIT needed to be repaid 
in full at the outset of the case, as well. Nor, more importantly, would 
there have been a meaningful opportunity to scrutinize CIT’s 
prebankruptcy loan or conduct. This matters because, as discussed 
below,286 the debtors had to agree to waive claims they had against CIT. 
Despite the limited ability to scrutinize the DIP loan or CIT’s pre-
bankruptcy conduct, the court approved it. In doing so, the court 
converted CIT’s prepetition loan into a post-petition loan which, 
pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 364(c)(2), (c)(3), and (d), 
constituted “valid, binding, enforceable, first priority, and perfected 
Liens.”287 The new CIT loan would have priority over any other liens on 
the debtor’s assets,288 and “super-priority” status over any first-priority 
administrative expenses.289 To protect this priority, Jevic was prohibited 
from incurring any first-priority administrative expenses, which would 
ordinarily include all operating expenses during bankruptcy, as well as 
professional fees. The super-priority status would continue even if the 
debtor’s Chapter 11 case were converted to a liquidation under Chapter 
7.290 Moreover, the loan could not be “crammed down” to the value of 
the collateral in the event the debtor sought to confirm a plan of 
reorganization that sought to do so.291 This would limit the debtor’s 
options under any plan, if the case got that far. 
The DIP loan also constrained participation for the rest of the case in 
other ways. First, like most DIP lenders, the DIP loan gave CIT a “veto” 
                                                     
285. Interestingly, the affidavit submitted by David Gorman, Jevic’s CEO, said nothing about 
efforts to obtain financing from any other lenders. He stated that CIT and the lenders in its group 
were “willing to provide the financing contemplated herein,” and that he “believe[d] that [the 
prepetition lenders] ha[d] acted in good faith in consenting to and in agreeing to provide the 
postpetition financing contemplated by” the DIP Financing Motions. See Declaration of David H. 
Gorman in Support of Debtors’ Chapter 11 Petitions & First Day Motions ¶ 61, In re Jevic Holding 
Corp., No. 08-11006 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. May 20, 2008). 
286. See discussion in this section. 
287. Final DIP Order, supra note 280, ¶ 24. 
288. Id. ¶ 26 (CIT’s DIP financing liens could not be “subordinated to or made pari passu with 
any other Lien under section 364(d) of the Bankruptcy Code or otherwise.”). 
289. Id. ¶ 29 (“priority . . . over all administrative expenses of the kind specified in section 503(b) 
or 507(b) of the Bankruptcy Code”). 
290. Id.  
291. As noted above, “[p]lans that are confirmed under section 1129(b) are often referred to as 
cramdown plans because they have been ‘crammed down the throats of objecting creditors.’” River 
Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal 
citations omitted), aff’d sub nom. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 
639 (2012). 
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over any major actions in the case.292 For example, the loan agreement 
limited the debtors’ ability to make non-ordinary course payments,293 
incur any indebtedness equal or senior in priority to the DIP financing,294 
or to make any disbursements materially outside the budget incorporated 
into the DIP financing.295 Moreover, many events that might occur in the 
case would be defaults under the loan agreement, permitting CIT 
immediately to foreclose. These included conversion of the case to a 
Chapter 7 liquidation, or the appointment of a trustee or examiner;296 
filing a plan or disclosure statement which did not provide for the full 
payment of the DIP loan or to which CIT did not agree;297 making any 
challenge to CIT’s prepetition claims298 or liens;299 the entry of an order 
granting relief from the stay permitting other creditors to foreclose on 
any of the debtor’s assets in excess of $50,000;300 or any change in 
senior management of the debtor.301 
Second, various provisions limited scrutiny of CIT’s conduct in the 
LBO, which apparently contributed to the need for bankruptcy in the 
first place.302 This would deter participation by litigation and prevent the 
estate from recovering money or assets from CIT for distribution to 
other creditors. For example, if CIT’s lien were not perfected, it would 
                                                     
292. Final DIP Order, supra note 280, ¶ 50. 
293. Exhibit A: Senior DIP Credit Agreement § 7.11, In re Jevic Holding Corp., No. 08-11006 
(BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. May 20, 2008) [hereinafter DIP Loan Agreement]. The form of DIP Loan 
Agreement was attached to the DIP Motion, supra note 32, but the final, executed agreement does 
not appear to be available. This discussion assumes that the executed version was the same as that 
presented to the bankruptcy court. 
294. DIP Loan Agreement, supra note 293, § 7.12. 
295. Id. § 7.15. 
296. Id. § 8.7(a). 
297. Id. § 8.7(c). 
298. Id. § 8.7(e).  
299. Id. § 8.7(l). 
300. Id. § 8.7(i).  
301. Id. § 8.8. 
302. The Final DIP Order provides that:  
[E]ach of the Debtors has waived and shall be barred from (i) challenging the amount, validity, 
extent, perfection, or priority or seeking to set aside, avoid, offset, or subordinate any of the 
Prepetition Indebtedness or any Liens or security interests . . . and (ii) asserting any other 
claims or causes of action against the [lenders] including, without limitation, claims for lender 
liability or pursuant to sections 105, 510, 544, 547, 548, 549 or 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Final DIP Order, supra note 280, ¶ 39. The timing is ironic. The debtor first granted this waiver at 
the outset of the case. Yet, one of the reasons given for the contested settlement was the cost and 
difficulty of determining the merits of any of these causes action, which, by that point, had been 
subject to several years of investigation and litigation. How could the DIP have known at the outset 
of the case that it did not have claims that, at the end of the case, the major parties agreed were too 
complex and difficult to litigate to term? 
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not be enforceable at all in bankruptcy, but the DIP loan prevented the 
debtor from challenging it on these grounds.303 Similarly, and more 
concretely, the estate had fraudulent transfer claims against CIT that 
were ultimately asserted by the creditors’ committee—but management 
for the debtor had to waive the debtor’s right to pursue those claims 
directly.304 While the creditors’ committee had authority to investigate 
CIT’s prebankruptcy actions, it had only seventy-five days to do so,305 
and any lawsuit that succeeded was an automatic default under the DIP 
financing.306 
Third, and more prosaically, lawyers for the creditors’ committee 
would have a limited budget to conduct any investigation,307 and could 
not use proceeds of the DIP financing to pay counsel for such 
investigations.308 Because the assets of the estate were fully encumbered 
by the DIP financing, there would be no cash in the estate other than 
proceeds of the DIP financing with which to pay counsel to the 
creditors’ committee to sue CIT. These limits may have played a role in 
committee counsels’ ultimate decision to recommend the structured 
dismissal that was later reversed by the Supreme Court. Without it, it 
was not clear how they would have been paid; with it, it was. 
                                                     
303. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(a), 551 (2012). If those loans were unperfected, it means that CIT would 
have had no priority at all. 
304. Even if the LBO liens were not fraudulent transfers, payments or liens CIT received in 
connection with the LBO might have been avoidable as fraudulent transfers or, if occurring within 
ninety days of the bankruptcy, preferential transfers. Id. §§ 544, 547–48.  
305. Final DIP Order, supra note 280, ¶ 39. 
306. Id. (“The entry of an order of the Bankruptcy Court, which results in the impairment of the 
[prepetition loan and security interest] shall constitute an immediate Event of Default under this 
Final Order and the Senior DIP Financing Documents.”). 
307. The Final DIP Order also approved a “Carve-Out” for professional fees of $1.365 million for 
estate professionals, and the lenders’ professionals. Id. ¶ 34. For a discussion of carveouts, see 
Richard B. Levin, Almost All You Ever Wanted to Know About Carve Out, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 445, 
449 (2002) (maintaining that while “the carve out protects the professionals . . . it also may benefit 
the secured creditor, which might have concluded that an orderly liquidation or restructuring 
process is likely to result in the highest net recovery on its claim, even after payment of carve out 
expenses”); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The (Il)Legitimacy of Bankruptcies for the Benefit of Secured 
Creditors, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 735, 750 (noting that “[i]t is not unusual for a secured creditor to 
carve out from proceeds of its collateral funds to cover professional fees and other administrative 
expenses”). 
308. Final DIP Order, supra note 280, ¶ 41. 
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, none of the Proceeds of the Senior DIP 
Financing may be used by any of the Debtors, the Committee, or any other person or any entity 
to (i) object to or contest in any manner the Senior DIP Indebtedness, or to assert or prosecute 
any actions, claims, or causes of action against any of the Senior DIP Indebtedness, or to assert 
or prosecute any actions, claims, or causes of action against any of the Senior DIP Agent . . . . 
Id. 
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In the structured dismissal hearing in Jevic, the bankruptcy judge 
ruled that he would approve the settlement of the fraudulent transfer suit 
due to the “dire circumstances”309 of the case: “[a] confirmable Chapter 
11 plan was unattainable. And there would be no funds to operate, 
investigate, or litigate were the case converted to a proceeding in 
Chapter 7.”310 This may have been true. But a review of the terms of the 
DIP financing in Jevic suggests that this was virtually inevitable from 
the outset because the debtor’s assets were fully encumbered and could 
not be used to pay any estate professionals—committee counsel or 
counsel to the debtor in possession—to challenge the senior lenders’ 
prebankruptcy transactions or any estate officers, such as a trustee, in the 
event the case was converted to a liquidation under Chapter 7. 
Moreover, CIT’s “veto” rights under the DIP loan gave it the power to 
decide how the rest of the case would proceed, including its exit path, 
the technical problem ultimately before the Supreme Court. 
2. Predictability and Procedural Integrity in the Jevic DIP Loan 
Arrogating power to senior creditors under DIP loans also threatens 
predictability and procedural integrity. If important decisions in the case 
are left to the whim of a single creditor, then it may be more difficult for 
other stakeholders to predict outcomes and bargain around them. Too 
much power may corrupt, and that may be the problem we see 
developing with DIP lending. 
As a DIP lender, the senior creditor may initially agree with other 
parties to attempt a reorganization in place through a Chapter 11 plan. 
But if it becomes impatient with the process or simply disagrees with 
management’s strategy, the DIP loan would give the lender the power to 
call the loan, making it virtually impossible for the debtor to take 
meaningful action. This may eliminate residual value that would 
otherwise flow to junior creditors. Even if a court were somehow able to 
preclude a DIP lender from exercising its rights under the DIP loan, its 
contractual leverage should lead most participants to think twice before 
proceeding without the DIP lender’s blessing. 
Consolidating this much power in the hands of a single stakeholder 
threatens the integrity of the process. The mechanisms built into the 
Jevic DIP loan deterred challenges to CIT’s conduct in connection with 
                                                     
309. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 982 (2017) (“The court 
accordingly decided to grant the motion in light of the ‘dire circumstances’ facing the estate and its 
creditors.”). 
310. Id. 
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the LBO, and efforts to avoid impermissible transfers of property of the 
debtor. If lenders such as CIT are able to use DIP financings to shield 
themselves from liability, there will be little reason to respect fraudulent 
transfer and similar law designed to protect creditors. Senior creditor 
power exercised through DIP loans enables them to turn the process on 
its head, to insulate themselves from scrutiny by the very creditors the 
system was meant to protect. 
To be sure, a single dominant secured party may also present 
economies of scale not available with multiple lenders. Fights between 
different tranches of secured debt suggest that there is not necessarily 
strength in numbers. So, the point is not that we should eliminate 
priority, or even its vesting in a single senior creditor. Rather, the point 
is that that creditor should not be able to use its seniority to materially 
impair participation, predictability, and the integrity of the process. 
C. Asset Sales 
Although Chapter 11 was designed to encourage going concerns to 
reorganize “in place,” Congress recognized that a debtor may need to 
sell assets before a plan is confirmed. As noted above, “363 sales” are 
common means of restructuring debtors, and may well be justified in 
many cases.311 Jevic was one such case. Problems of process quality can 
arise, however, when senior creditors insert themselves into the sale 
process. Sales have become popular with senior creditors because they 
may enable the creditor to cash out quickly and, perhaps equally 
important, to use their leverage to influence the sale process in at least 
three ways.312 
1. Sale Timing 
First, the senior creditor may seek to control the timing of the sale 
through its position as DIP lender. Usually, this means sooner rather 
than later. This takes us back to the Chapter 11 bankruptcies of 
                                                     
311. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2012) (“The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or 
lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate . . . .”). 
312. There are different views about how often senior creditors actually demand sales. Compare 
Baird, supra note 13, at 811 (“The senior creditors can often use their ability to withhold financing 
as a lever to ensure the speedy sale happens.”), with Westbrook, supra note 261, at 844 (“The 
conventional narrative assumes that cases that are controlled by secured creditors are likely to 
involve section 363 sales. That part of the narrative also appears open to serious question. Cases 
with a high percentage of secured debt seem less likely to have sales of assets . . . .”). But, as shown 
in this subpart, there is little question that senior creditors can significantly influence the process, if 
they wish to do so. 
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automakers Chrysler and General Motors.313 As noted above, in these 
cases, the government had become the automakers’ senior lenders under 
DIP loans in the respective cases. In Chrysler, the United States and 
Canadian governments facilitated negotiations with Fiat and Chrysler to 
produce a sale agreement dated April 30, 2009, the same day that 
Chrysler filed its Chapter 11 petition.314 GM filed its Chapter 11 petition 
on June 1 and, on the same day, the court approved its proposed sale 
transaction under section 363.315 The Bankruptcy Court in GM 
determined that, like Chrysler, there was a “need for speed” in 
approving the 363 Transaction: 
Other than the U.S. Treasury and [Canadian government], there 
are no lenders willing and able to finance GM’s continued 
operations. Similarly, there are no lenders willing and able to 
finance GM in a prolonged Chapter 11 case. The continued 
availability of the financing provided by the Treasury is 
expressly conditioned upon approval of [the 363 Motion] by 
July 10, and prompt closing of the 363 Transaction . . . . Without 
such financing, GM faces immediate liquidation.316 
The problem with speed is that it is often unclear whether the sale 
maximizes value because it stanches the bleeding, or is instead evidence 
of collusion between senior creditors, managers and purchasers. 
Assessing the automaker cases, Professors Jacoby and Janger recently 
observed that “[t]he answer is a little bit of both.”317 
This suggests that courts should be mindful of the participatory 
effects of the pace they permit. Severe time constraints may limit 
shopping of a debtor’s assets and potential purchasers’ efforts to conduct 
due diligence. These participatory failures may, in turn, depress bids. 
Although concerned creditors can object to the sale process, and the sale 
itself, the standard that governs such sales, as noted above, is quite 
loose: “business judgment.”318 Absent evidence of collusion—which 
takes time to ascertain—it seems unlikely that an individual creditor 
could object effectively. A creditors’ committee would have standing to 
object, but speed will also limit its effectiveness. Appealing a sale order 
is difficult because winning bidders enjoy special protections to promote 
                                                     
313. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 111–12 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State 
Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009) (mem.). 
314. Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 111–12 (2d Cir. 2009). 
315. GM Debtors’ Motion, supra note 187. 
316. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 484 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
317. Jacoby & Janger, supra note 276, at 866. 
318. See discussion supra section I.B.1.  
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closure. Bankruptcy sales are usually final and difficult to appeal absent 
a showing of collusion.319 
It may seem counterintuitive that a senior creditor would rush a sale 
that depresses bids for the assets. But, this might happen either because 
the senior creditor believes the asset values are declining—the “ice cube 
is melting,” in the vernacular—or, as discussed below, it would prefer to 
acquire the assets itself, through a credit bid. 
A senior creditor’s power to control timing also reduces 
predictability. Whether there will be a quick sale may—or may not—be 
clear from the outset. In any case, if the senior creditor has the power 
under a DIP loan agreement to control when the sale occurs, then it—
and not the interests of other stakeholders or participants, such as 
potential purchasers—will strongly influence when the sale occurs. It 
may be difficult to know the senior creditor’s views or motivations—or 
that the senior creditor’s strategy will necessarily be sound. Priority may 
confer procedural power, but there is no evidence that priority reduces a 
senior creditor’s fallibility. 
Speed also threatens procedural integrity because it will be difficult 
for parties to know whether there was collusion among the senior 
creditor, the purchaser, and/or select other creditors. For example, a 
serious concern raised in the automaker cases was that the senior 
creditors were able to use their leverage not only to rush the sales, but 
also to effectively foreclose any scrutiny of the “winners” and “losers” 
that were picked among the debtors’ suppliers. Some suppliers were 
entitled to continue to sell to the post-bankruptcy carmakers, and they 
would obviously fare better than those who did not. Were those deals the 
product of arms’ length bargaining or illicit pressure? The need for 
speed and finality made it practically impossible to anticipate or 
challenge the outcomes there. As noted above, while it may be possible 
to view Jevic as resolving unfinished business from Chrysler, it does not 
change the fact that many were left queasy about the integrity of the 
process there.320 
2. Credit Bidding 
A second way that senior creditors may control the sale process will 
be through “credit bidding.” Bankruptcy Code section 363(k) permits a 
secured creditor to use the debt owed to it as “credit” toward the 
purchase price for the debtor’s assets if the creditor happens to be the 
                                                     
319. 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2012). 
320. See, e.g., Brubaker & Tabb, supra note 16, at 1378; Roe & Skeel, supra note 28. 
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purchaser.321 The premise is straightforward: instead of using cash, the 
creditor can bid for the debtor’s assets in the amount of its claim against 
the debtor.322 If the credit bid is the winning bid, the creditor can take 
possession of the collateral323 and offset the amount of her claim against 
the purchase price of the property.324 
A secured creditor’s right to credit bid is not absolute and may be 
limited “for cause.”325 As in other contexts, the Bankruptcy Code does 
not define the term “cause,” but as with timing, the chief concern has 
been distributive, that the right to credit bid may chill competitive 
bidding.326 Proponents of credit bidding argue that it promotes 
competition because other potential bidders will view the senior 
creditor’s bid as an informed signal of confidence in the value of the 
debtor’s assets.327 But this assumes that the senior creditor knows more 
about the assets than potential purchasers.328 The senior creditor may, 
however, be wrong, and other purchases will not know. Fearing that the 
“ice cube is melting,” other potential bidders may (wrongly) assume that 
the senior creditor is undersecured, and there would be no sense in 
                                                     
321. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (“At a sale under subsection (b) of this section of property that is subject 
to a lien that secures an allowed claim, unless the court for cause orders otherwise the holder of such 
claim may bid at such sale, and, if the holder of such claim purchases such property, such holder 
may offset such claim against the purchase price of such property.”). 
322. Randall Klein & Danielle Juhle, Majority Rules: Non-Cash Bids and the Reorganization 
Sale, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 297, 317 (2010). Creditors may also cash bid for any residual amount 
necessary to purchase the property. Vincent S. J. Buccola & Ashley C. Keller, Credit Bidding and 
the Design of Bankruptcy Auctions, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 104 (2010). 
323. Quality Props. Asset Mgmt. Co. v. Trump Va. Acquisitions, LLC, No. 3:11-CV-00053, 2012 
WL 3542527, at *7 n.13 (W.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2012) (“By using its credit to outbid a sale to a third 
party at a lower price, the secured creditor can choose to take possession of its collateral . . . .”); 
Buccola & Keller, supra note 322, at 102.  
324. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.09 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 
2018); see also Bellair, Inc., v. Aviall of Tex., Inc., 819 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tex. App. 1991) (“Setoff 
is the doctrine of bringing into the presence of each other the obligations of A to B and B to A, and 
by the judicial action of the court making each obligation extinguish the other.” (quoting Nalle v. 
Harrell, 12 S.W.2d 550, 551 (Tex. 1939))). 
325. In re Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, 464 B.R. 337, 347–48 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011). 
326. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 316 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Fisker Auto. 
Holdings, Inc., 510 B.R. 55, 60 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014); In re The Free Lance-Star Publ’g Co. of 
Fredericksburg, 512 B.R. 798, 806 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014). 
327. Buccola & Keller, supra note 322, at 100.  
328. See, e.g., In re Miami Gen. Hosp., Inc., 81 B.R. 682, 688 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (“FABT’s credit 
bid escalated the bidding and enabled the Trustee to realize an additional $450,000.00 more than 
General Health’s bid of $15,050,000.00.”).  
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attempting to submit a topping bid.329 Or, they would not view the assets 
as having sufficient value to justify the cost of investigation. 
As with a senior creditor’s ability to influence the speed of a sale, 
credit bidding creates risks of error and expropriation. The American 
Bankruptcy Institute’s Chapter 11 Commission recently conceded that 
“all credit bidding chills an auction process to some extent” but “did not 
believe that the chilling effect of credit bids alone should suffice as 
cause under section 363(k).”330 Like super-priority DIP lending, credit 
bidding has the potential to undermine process values of participation, 
predictability, and procedural integrity. 
3. Controlling the Distribution of Sale Proceeds—“Gifting” and 
Property of the Estate? 
Senior creditors may also challenge Jevic’s process values by using 
their priority to manipulate what constitutes property of the estate, and 
thus control final distributions. In theory, the proceeds of a sale of the 
debtor are property of the estate, which must be distributed in order of 
priority unless a priority creditor consents. But, if the assets were 
encumbered, the proceeds would also be subject to the senior creditors’ 
lien.331 Senior creditors have used this property-based position to argue 
that their priority in the debtor’s assets entitles them to make a “gift” of 
it to induce junior stakeholders to support a resolution that the senior 
creditor prefers. In theory, this is usually impermissible.332 In practice, 
however, senior creditors appear to use their priority to control this 
aspect of the process as well. 
For example, on the same day in January 2015 that Jevic was argued 
before the Third Circuit, another panel of the Third Circuit heard 
argument in In re ICL Holding Co. (LifeCare).333 LifeCare involved a 
                                                     
329. Geoffrey K. McDonald, The Road Not Taken: RadLAX and the Unstated Constitutional 
Basis and Limits of a Secured Creditor’s Right to Credit Bid at a Bankruptcy Sale of Its Collateral, 
2014 ANN. SURV. BANKR. LAW 9.  
330. See ABI REPORT, supra note 7, at 147. 
331. U.C.C. § 9-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000). 
332. Compare In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d 507, 509 (3d Cir. 2005) (forbidding inter-
class gifting), and DISH Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 
79, 97 (2d Cir. 2010) (same), with Official, Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Stern (In re SPM Mfg. 
Corp.), 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993) (permitting gifting in a Chapter 7 liquidation). 
333. 802 F.3d 547 (3d Cir. 2015). Both were argued Jan. 14, 2015. See id.; Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 
2015), rev’d sub nom. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017). The 
LifeCare debtors had previously been known as “Lifecare.” LifeCare Holdings, Inc. was at one time 
a leading operator of long-term acute care hospitals. See In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d at 549–50. 
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“quick sale” of the debtors, a healthcare provider, to its secured 
creditors.334 Prior to the sale, the debtors had apparently marketed 
themselves to various suitors, none of whom were willing to pay more 
than about 80% of the outstanding secured debt. The secured creditors, 
on the other hand, were willing to credit bid about 90% of what they 
were owed, and to pay the costs of professionals, including a creditors’ 
committee.335 One day before going into bankruptcy, the debtors entered 
into an asset purchase agreement with the secured creditors.336 Although 
the opinion is somewhat unclear on this, it appears that as part of the 
purchase agreement, and prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy, 
the secured creditors also deposited funds into separate escrow accounts 
to cover the costs of professionals and to wind down the debtor’s 
operations.337 
The creditors’ committee and United States Government objected to 
the sale.338 The committee argued that the sale was a “veiled 
foreclosure” that would leave the bankruptcy estate administratively 
insolvent, unable to pay expenses such as committee counsel’s fees.339 
As in Jevic, the senior creditors and the creditors’ committee then 
entered into a settlement agreement. The secured creditors agreed to 
deposit $3.5 million in trust for the benefit of general unsecured 
                                                     
While in Chapter 11, Lifecare was referred to as “LCI.” According to Judge Ambro, “per its plan of 
reorganization it became ‘ICL.’” Id. at 549 n.1. It is not entirely clear what this means. A search of 
the docket reveals no evidence that a plan was ever confirmed. See Dkt., In re ICL Holding Co., 
No. 12-13319-KG (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 11, 2012). Instead, it appears to have been resolved by a 
structured dismissal similar in certain respects to that involved in Jevic.  
334. In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d at 551 (“[T]he [Bankruptcy] Court described LifeCare’s 
condition as getting progressively worse; in bankruptcy talk, it was a ‘melting ice cube.’”). 
335. Id. at 550 (the secured creditors agreed to “credit $320 million of the $355 million debt they 
were then owed”).  
336. Id. (“filed for bankruptcy one day after entering into the Asset Purchase Agreement”). 
337. Judge Ambro explained: 
In addition to its credit bid, the purchaser [secured creditors] agreed to pay the legal and 
accounting fees of LifeCare and the Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) and 
to pick up the tab for the company’s wind-down costs. Because the professionals hadn’t 
completed their work, the agreement directed the purchaser to deposit cash funds into separate 
escrow accounts. Any money that went unspent had to be returned to it. 
Id. 
338. Id. at 551. 
339. Id. at 550–51. Of course, if the valuations were correct, this would appear to be true even if 
the bankruptcy court had not approved the sale. In that event, it seems most likely that the cases 
would have been dismissed and the secured creditors would have foreclosed on the debtors’ assets, 
which might have been complicated, since the debtors had thirty-four subsidiaries, “which together 
operated 27 long-term acute care hospitals in 10 states and had about 4,500 employees.” Id. at 550. 
A state foreclosure sale—the secured creditors’ other real option—seemed considerably less 
efficient than a sale through bankruptcy. 
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creditors, skipping over the “mid-priority” tax claims of the government, 
which claimed that the sale would result in about $24 million in capital 
gains tax liability.340 The government objected, arguing that making a 
distribution to junior unsecured creditors violated the absolute priority 
rule.341 The bankruptcy court effectively dodged the question, however, 
because it found that the escrowed funds were not property of the estate 
at all, and thus not subject to the ordinary priority rules. Rather, 
“because the Settlement Agreement permits a distribution directly to the 
unsecured creditors from the purchaser, it is an indication that [the 
funds] are not property of [LifeCare’s] estate[,] and as such, the absolute 
priority rule . . . is not implicated.”342 
The government appealed both the bankruptcy court’s approval of the 
sale and the settlement. The issue, in substance, was whether “the 
escrowed funds and settlement money were proceeds paid to obtain 
LifeCare’s assets, and thus qualify as estate property that should have 
been (but wasn’t) paid out according to the Code’s creditor-payment 
scheme.”343 If these funds were property of the estate, the priority rules 
might apply to them (a question that Jevic later answered affirmatively). 
If not, then it is not clear that any Bankruptcy Code distributive rules 
would apply to them. The Bankruptcy Code does not, as a general 
matter, affect property that is not property of the estate.344 
Bankruptcy Code section 541(a)(1) defines “property of the estate” as 
“all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case.”345 Section 541(a)(6) provides that property 
of the estate includes “proceeds . . . of or from property of the estate.”346 
Thus, Judge Ambro reasoned for the Third Circuit that “if either the 
escrowed funds or settlement sums are ‘proceeds of or from property of 
the estate,’ they qualify as estate property.”347 The government argued 
                                                     
340. Id. at 551 (“The Government, for its part, argued that the sale would result in capital-gains 
tax liability estimated at $24 million, giving it an administrative claim that would go unpaid.”). 
341. Id. at 552 (government argued that “the settlement money was property of the estate” and 
that “bypassing it and paying the unsecured creditors disturbed the Code’s priority scheme for the 
payment of creditors”).  
342. Id. at 552 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
343. Id. at 555. 
344. Bankruptcy has long been viewed as a process “in rem,” although this is a bit of a fiction. 
See Michelle M. Harner, The Value of Soft Variables in Corporate Reorganizations, 2015 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 509; Jonathan C. Lipson, Fighting Fiction with Fiction—The New Federalism in (A Tobacco 
Company) Bankruptcy, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1271 (2000).  
345. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012). 
346. Id. § 541(a)(6). 
347. In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d at 555. 
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that the settlement proceeds were property of the estate because “the 
secured lenders’ payment to the Committee was in substance an 
increased bid for LifeCare’s assets.”348 
Judge Ambro rejected this. While it was “true that the secured lenders 
paid cash to resolve objections to the sale of LifeCare’s assets, that 
money never made it into the estate.”349 Rather, relying on the analysis 
of the bankruptcy court in In re TISC, Inc.,350 he reasoned that where 
“the purchaser’s ‘funds [were] not proceeds from a secured creditor’s 
liens, [they] do not belong to the estate, and will not become part of the 
estate.’”351 So, too, here: 
[T]he secured lender group, using that group’s own funds, made 
payments to unsecured creditors . . . . [T]he settlement sums 
paid by the purchaser were not proceeds from its liens, did not at 
any time belong to LifeCare’s estate, and will not become part 
of its estate even as a pass-through.352 
Contra Jevic, Judge Ambro in LifeCare believed that there was no 
property that was clearly property of the estate, available for distribution 
to unsecured creditors. 
In LifeCare, the government had also objected to the treatment of the 
professional fees and wind-down expenses, which had been escrowed by 
the senior creditor prior to bankruptcy and which, Judge Ambro 
observed, presented “a more difficult question.”353 The government had 
argued that these, too, had to be considered property of the estate 
because they were explicitly made part of the purchase price paid to the 
debtor prior to the bankruptcy.354 Although Judge Ambro acknowledged 
that “aspects of the Government’s argument are factually correct, we 
cannot ignore the economic reality of what actually occurred.”355 
The “economic reality,” Judge Ambro reasoned, was that the secured 
creditors purchased all of the debtors’ assets, including their cash. While 
some of that cash was to be used to consummate the transaction, it was 
                                                     
348. Id.  
349. Id.  
350. 393 B.R. 71 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008). 
351. In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d at 556 (quoting In re TSIC, 393 B.R. at 77). 
352. Id. at 555–56. 
353. Id. at 556. 
354. Id. (“The Government urges us to reverse that ruling because the funds were listed in 
subsections 3.1(a) and (b) of the Asset Purchase Agreement as part of the purchase price (indeed, 
they were called ‘[c]onsideration’) for LifeCare’s assets and thus qualify as estate property under 
Bankruptcy Code § 541(a)(6) (including as property of the estate ‘proceeds’ from a debtor’s asset 
sale).”). 
355. Id. 
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held in escrow, not generally available to the debtors, and any residual 
was to revert to the purchasers, and not remain with the debtors. 
Moreover, and perhaps more basically, because the senior creditors were 
under-secured credit bidders, “once the sale closed, there technically was 
no more estate property.”356 
Judge Ambro “recognize[d] that, in the abstract, it may seem strange 
for a creditor to claim ownership of cash that it parted with in exchange 
for something.”357 Here, however, he maintained that “it makes sense” 
because the escrowed funds in question were “to facilitate . . . a 
smooth . . . transfer of the assets from the debtors’ estates to [the secured 
lenders] by resolving objections to that transfer.”358 “To assure that no 
funds reached LifeCare’s estate, the secured lenders agreed to pay cash 
for services and expenses through escrow arrangements.”359 
LifeCare is a difficult and troubling decision. Some may think that 
Jevic negates it, because Jevic in substance forbad what LifeCare 
permitted. That, however, may be a hasty conclusion. LifeCare answered 
a different question: what was property of the estate to begin with?360 
Jevic did not address this, instead assuming (correctly) that the payments 
to settle the estate’s fraudulent transfer suit were property of the estate, a 
point Judge Scirica made explicitly in his dissent in the court of appeals 
and that no one seriously challenged thereafter.361 Jevic may be about 
priority, whereas LifeCare is about property of the estate. Whatever 
                                                     
356. “Put another way,” he explained the following: 
[G]etting $320 million of its secured debt forgiven resulted in the secured lender group getting 
all the property of LifeCare. This is an important point. The Government’s argument presumes 
that any residual cash from the sale—namely the monies earmarked for fees and wind-down 
costs—would become property of LifeCare. . . . But that is impossible because LifeCare agreed 
to surrender all of its cash. And, per the sale order, whatever remains of the $1.8 million in 
escrow goes back to where it came from—the secured lenders’ account (as indeed happened by 
the time of oral argument to over $800,000 placed into escrow). Thus, as a matter of substance, 
we cannot conclude that the escrowed funds were estate property. 
Id. 
357. Id. at 557. 
358. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
359. Id.  
360. Courts since Jevic seem untroubled by the holding in LifeCare. See, e.g., Hargreaves v. 
Nuverra Envtl. Sols., Inc. (In re Nuverra Envtl. Solutions., Inc.), No. 17-10949-KJC, 2017 WL 
3326453, at *3 (D. Del. Aug. 3, 2017) (citing LifeCare for proposition that a “gift from senior 
lenders to certain, but not all, classes of general unsecured creditors” is permissible). 
361. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding 
Corp.), 787 F.3d 173, 188 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Critical to this analysis is the fact that the money paid by 
the secured creditors in the settlement was property of the estate.”), rev’d sub nom. Czyzewski v. 
Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017). 
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effect priority has is not relevant to property that is not property of the 
estate.362 
But LifeCare suggests that priority does confer on senior secured 
creditors the power to influence the determination of what is property of 
the estate under some conditions, and this is problematic. Both the 
prepetition escrow and post-petition trusts contained funds that could 
have been proceeds of property of the estate, because “proceeds” 
includes property received on account of, or arising from, property of the 
estate.363 Perhaps because the latter resulted from settling the 
committee’s objection, they were somehow different than the proceeds 
of the fraudulent transfer settlement in Jevic. But that seems oddly 
formalistic: in both LifeCare and Jevic, funds were paid to resolve rights 
asserted on behalf of the estate. It is not clear why they would have been 
exclusively property of the senior creditor in LifeCare but property of 
the estate in Jevic. 
Yet, it is not hard to see why the Third Circuit believed that the 
exigencies of the case required the court to accommodate the deal the 
secured creditors and debtors had crafted. The LifeCare debtors operated 
twenty-seven long-term acute care hospitals in ten states and had about 
4,500 employees.364 If the value of the debtors was in fact below the 
amount of the senior claims, the senior creditors were undersecured; 
there would have been no equity in the estate with which to pay any 
unsecured creditors, whether priority or otherwise. The fact that the 
important transactions were structured before and outside bankruptcy 
meant, at least to Judge Ambro, that these transactions determined the 
size and shape of the estate in bankruptcy. It appears that the senior 
creditors largely called these shots, and because they were undersecured, 
no one was in a position to challenge this. 
All of this would seem to be in tension with Jevic’s process values. 
The LifeCare deal as structured may have been meant “to facilitate . . . a 
smooth . . . transfer of the assets from the debtors’ estates to [the secured 
lenders] by resolving objections to that transfer.”365 But, it may also have 
been structured to facilitate a fraudulent or preferential transfer or, as the 
                                                     
362. But see David R. Kuney, Implications of Czyewski v. Jevic: Will Jevic Alter the Delicate 
Leverage of Bankruptcy Bargaining?, in AM. BANKR. INST., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
BANKRUPTCY JUDGES: EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS 8, 16–19 (2017), https://ncbjmeeting.org/pyny 
9804/NCBJ17_ABI_Materials_Book_5%20programs.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5L3-R7MH] 
(discussing unpublished opinion in In re Constellation Enterprises, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-00757-UNA 
(D. Del.), applying Jevic to property that was arguably not property of the estate). 
363. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
364. In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d at 550. 
365. Id. at 557 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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government insinuated, a way to avoid paying capital gains tax. Whether 
the deal could have been challenged on those grounds depends on the 
value of the debtor’s assets and the quality of management’s efforts to 
market the debtors. Here, perhaps the court took comfort in the fact 
management apparently marketed the debtors to over 100 potential 
purchasers prior to agreeing to the “sale” to the secured creditors and 
could find no better deal.366 
But, given the structure of the sale, there was little way to check this. 
Participation involves, among other things, scrutiny. That is ordinarily 
the job of counsel to the creditors’ committee. It is not, however, clear 
how a committee could do so under these conditions. While the 
committee objected to the sale, it is unlikely that committee counsel was 
able to investigate and challenge management’s prebankruptcy efforts to 
sell the debtors. Nor do we know whether an effort to market and sell the 
debtors through a more conventional section 363 sale in bankruptcy 
(rather than before) might have produced a price that topped the credit 
bid and produced a better return to the estate. Nor is it clear whether 
committee counsel could have investigated and challenged prepetition 
payments the senior creditors may have received. Under ordinary rules 
regarding the avoidance of preferential transfers, property of the debtors 
that they received during the ninety days before bankruptcy may have 
been recoverable by the estate.367 If nothing else, the agreement to sell 
the debtor’s assets one day before bankruptcy would have been a 
transfer that warranted this scrutiny. These are all forms of participation 
that the deal structure in LifeCare made difficult, if not impossible. 
Moreover, giving the senior creditor the power to direct the sale 
proceeds undercuts the participatory logic of Jevic. If participation 
includes the power to decide how final distributions are made, then 
permitting the senior creditor to pick and choose which other creditors 
are paid via the Chapter 11 process is problematic because that process 
exists in part to give all stakeholders a say in what becomes of the 
debtor’s assets. The senior creditor that wants to control the distribution 
of a debtor’s assets may do so under generally applicable state law, such 
as the Uniform Commercial Code, outside of bankruptcy. It is difficult 
to justify the existence of the Chapter 11 process, however, if it merely 
serves the distributive goals of senior creditors. 
LifeCare would also seem to tolerate a level of unpredictability that is 
problematic under Jevic, for two reasons. First, vesting a single creditor 
                                                     
366. According to the opinion, the debtors were marketed to 106 potential purchasers. Id. at 550. 
367. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2012). 
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group with the power to pick winners, rather than the vote of the whole, 
or resorting to absolute priority, makes it hard for creditors to know ex 
ante whether (or what) they will be paid. The senior creditor’s power to 
control whether there was a valuation and then who got paid what from 
the settlement meant that final distributions were at the whim of a single 
group of secured creditors. Second, the Third Circuit’s approach to 
property of the estate is destabilizing. Giving senior creditors the power 
to structure transactions in order to enable them to determine what is and 
is not property of the estate cedes courts’ power to make that 
determination independently. While “property” is sometimes a 
contentious doctrinal category, its use in LifeCare creates greater 
uncertainty for future cases, where we can expect senior creditors to use 
similar tactics to control the reorganization process. 
And all of this threatens the procedural integrity of the Chapter 11 
process. It is hard to look at the deal in LifeCare and avoid the 
conclusion that it was structured to avoid taxes. Maybe it would not 
survive scrutiny under tax law. But bankruptcy law and practice should 
not tolerate that result either. It is perhaps ironic in that the U.S. 
government was the senior creditor in the automaker cases, where it used 
its senior status to force through quick sales and pick and choose 
“winners” among the debtors’ creditors. Here, the U.S. government, as 
taxing authority, was on the other side, and understandably unhappy 
about it. Perhaps, the LifeCare court believed, what is sauce for the 
goose is sauce for the gander. 
V. OPPORTUNITIES AFTER JEVIC 
Still, Jevic is now the law of the land, and its process-value 
framework may limit LifeCare’s property-based logic. Determining 
whether it does so presents one of several opportunities that Jevic creates 
for scholars and practitioners. This part briefly sketches several others. 
A. Opportunities for Scholars 
Jevic’s process values invite observers to investigate the relationship 
between priority and process. For those who are empirically minded, 
consider some questions: 
 
x How does Jevic affect the supply of, and demand for, various 
resolution mechanisms in bankruptcy? Does Jevic raise the cost of 
using Chapter 11 by requiring more plans and fewer structured 
dismissals after Jevic? Or do crafty lawyers devise new 
mechanisms, suggested by LifeCare, that may get around Jevic’s 
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narrowly tailored holding, undercutting its process values along the 
way? 
x How does Jevic affect resource allocation within Chapter 11 cases? 
Do we observe smaller DIP loans, larger carveouts, or other 
mechanisms that alter estate liquidity after Jevic? The process 
values Jevic seems to have in mind are not costless. Paying for 
them may require the use of assets otherwise subject to a lien. 
x How does Jevic affect governance in reorganization? Does it result 
in increased committee power? Or does it fragment that power, as 
individual creditors use Jevic’s consent standard to assert strategic 
objections, perhaps conflicting with the goals of committee 
counsel? 
x How does Jevic affect the 363 sale? Do we find greater market 
participation after Jevic? Or do the dynamics of sales remain 
unchanged? 
x How does Jevic affect “gifting,” whether under plans or otherwise? 
One reading of Jevic may be that it forbids gifting because it 
requires absolute priority and individuates consent: even a 
confirmed plan could not overcome it. Yet, the property-based 
logic of LifeCare may be compelling to some. If so, then the 
important question is the value of the collateral—a determination 
that the secured creditor may be able to control. 
x Does Jevic affect aggregate use of Chapter 11? If Jevic reduces the 
value of Chapter 11 to senior creditors because it constrains their 
control, perhaps senior creditors will increasingly foreclose outside 
bankruptcy? 
 
For those who are more conceptually oriented, Jevic squarely presents 
in bankruptcy the question scholars of broader procedural domains have 
wrestled with for many years: how do we compare the costs and benefits 
of alternative processes?368 In its modern form, the question is oriented 
around the extent to which contract can or should displace ostensibly 
“mandatory” rules of civil procedure and evidence. Proponents of 
“contract procedure” suggest that permitting parties to customize 
adjudicative options promotes efficient outcomes both for the parties 
themselves and courts.369 Opponents worry about both distributive 
                                                     
368. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 257, 257 (1974) (examining the “conditions under which greater specificity or greater 
generality is the efficient choice” in the legal process based on a cost-benefit analysis). 
369. See, e.g., Jay Brudz & Jonathon M. Redgrave, Using Contract Terms to Get Ahead of 
Prospective eDiscovery Costs and Burdens in Commercial Litigation, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13 
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infirmities—the weak will unwittingly contract away their right to 
discovery, for example—and public values such as the inherent merits of 
the adversary system, the creation of a stock of accessible precedent, and 
so on.370 Although this is a large and growing body of literature, it has 
made no apparent headway among bankruptcy scholars.371 If Jevic is 
telling us something about the relationship between (private) priority 
rights and (public) process values, it invites a richer assessment of the 
relationship between these two bodies of scholarship. 
B. Opportunities for Practitioners 
Jevic has already affected practice, leading at least one court to refuse 
to approve a structured dismissal on grounds that priority creditors 
objected.372 Some worry that Jevic may threaten other practices that have 
developed in Chapter 11, on grounds that they defy an “absolute” theory 
of priority, such as “first-day” orders that prepay wages and vendors 
“critical” to the debtors’ survival.373 While these concerns seem 
somewhat exaggerated—Jevic was careful to speak only about final 
distributions374—it remains true that junior stakeholders, and those who 
would advocate for them, are often at odds with senior creditors, and that 
the inflection points are procedural moments: DIP financing and asset 
sales. 
While there are litigated solutions to these problems, I have argued 
elsewhere that under the right conditions, contract may be a superior 
                                                     
(2012); Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure 
Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461 (2007); Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: 
Private Ordering of Public Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514 (2009); Robert E. Scott & George 
G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 856–78 (2006).  
370. David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection 
Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973 (2008); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2005) (focusing largely on post-dispute contracting); David H. 
Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private 
Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085 
(2002); Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 181. 
371. An earlier hint came from Steve Schwarcz who argued plausibly that “when a debtor and all 
of its creditors agree to a procedure contract, there is little question that the contract should be 
enforced.” See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 
TEX. L. REV. 515, 600 (1999). While true, this describes idealized conditions that almost never 
occur in bankruptcy, and so cannot solve the problems the system faces.  
372. In re Fryar, 570 B.R. 602, 610 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2017). 
373. See, e.g., Georgakopoulos, supra note 3, at 934–36.  
374. See, e.g., Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 984 (2017) 
(forbidding payments approved by the lower courts as “the exact kind of nonconsensual priority-
violating final distributions that the Code prohibits in Chapter 7 liquidations and Chapter 11 plans”). 
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basis for reordering in bankruptcy. The bench and bar in large 
bankruptcies form a “contracting environment,” a fairly discrete 
universe of repeat players.375 These relationships are a double-edged 
sword: they might invite collusive conduct that offends Jevic, or they 
may create opportunities for innovation—or both. Channeled properly, 
they can help to address the problems of expropriation and error that dog 
corporate reorganization. 
1. Case Financing After Jevic 
Consider first adjustments to the design of case financing agreements. 
As noted above, these seem to be the key mechanism by which senior 
creditors seize control. Participants can avoid some of the process 
problems that led to Jevic through broader carveouts. Carveouts in 
bankruptcy are sometimes viewed as the price that senior lenders must 
“pay to play.”376 If Jevic induces participants to rethink DIP loans like 
the one there, which hog-tie the debtor at the outset, they may conclude 
that a larger carveout is the solution. In the past, courts seemed to take 
the position that DIP loans had to include generous carveouts.377 
Bankruptcy judges cannot, however, force senior creditors to grant 
carveouts. They can seek to persuade the DIP lender to make these 
concessions. Moreover, they can threaten to convert or dismiss the case 
if the senior creditors do not accede. But that may be a game of chicken 
bankruptcy judges do not want to play. 
Similarly, courts should consider approving DIP loans in smaller 
increments. It is not clear why courts must approve large DIP loans on 
an “emergency” basis at the outset of a case. As seen in Jevic, while 
there may have been an urgent need for about $5 million to cover costs 
of goods in transit, the bulk of the DIP loan was apparently earmarked to 
pay off CIT, the prepetition senior creditor. It is hard to see how this was 
                                                     
375. Lipson, supra note 114, at 245 (“[L]arge Chapter 11 cases now create what Robert Scott, a 
leading relational theorist, would call a ‘contracting environment.’” (citing Robert E. Scott, The 
Promise and the Peril of Relational Contract Theory, in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP 
OF STEWART MACAULAY 105, 108 (Braucher et al. eds., 2013))). 
376. Mooney, Jr., supra note 307, at 750–51 (“Commentators have noted that in a secured 
creditor bankruptcy the secured creditor may be required to ‘pay to play’—i.e., to carve out of its 
collateral funds for the benefit of general unsecured creditors.”). 
377. See In re Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34, 38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“[I]t has been 
the uniform practice in this Court . . . to insist on a carve out from a super-priority status and post-
petition lien in a reasonable amount designed to provide for payment of the fees of debtor’s and the 
committees’ counsel and possible trustee’s counsel in order to preserve the adversary system. 
Absent such protection, the collective rights and expectations of all parties-in-interest are sorely 
prejudiced.”). 
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an emergency. Of course, if it was an emergency, CIT already had a 
remedy: foreclosure in state court outside of bankruptcy. But it appears 
that CIT, like many senior lenders, did not want that process, preferring 
Chapter 11. 
DIP carveouts and loan size/timing affect participation. Without an 
adequate carveout, committee counsel cannot effectively represent all 
unsecured creditors. If a debtor’s assets are fully encumbered by a post-
petition lien, it is not clear how effectively anyone other than the secured 
creditor can participate in meaningful decisions about the debtor’s fate. 
Moreover, there are specific terms in DIP loans that courts should 
forbid. Provisions that trigger defaults if the estate investigates or sues 
the senior creditor have no place in this context, because they undermine 
predictability and procedural integrity. Prohibiting committee counsel or 
other estate professionals from using estate funds to do so has the same 
effect. So too with estate waivers of claim objections, or the release of 
claims against senior creditors in a DIP loan. 
2. Asset Sales After Jevic 
Those concerned about constraints on participation in sales should 
consider the use of “earnouts.” Sometimes called a “contingent price” 
agreement, an earnout provides that a portion of the purchase price in the 
sale of a business will be deferred until after the sale, and paid based on 
the post-closing performance of the business, as run by the buyer.378 
Although these can be complicated, in substance they are similar to the 
“ice cube bond” advocated by Jacoby and Janger.379 Under an ice-cube 
bond, the purchaser would post a bond to assure that it was not 
underpaying due to the hasty nature of the sale. The sale would close, 
however, producing the closure that many deem essential to the process. 
The main differences between a bond and an earnout appear to be that 
earnouts are more price-sensitive and better known to practitioners. The 
problem with ice cube bonds is the problem with all distributive 
decisions made under poor procedural and informational conditions: the 
risks of expropriation and error are high. It is not clear, for example, how 
or when to price the ice-cube bond, how to decide whether the estate 
                                                     
378. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 
94 YALE L.J. 239, 266 (1984) (“[A] complete earnout formula is a complicated state-contingent 
contract that, by carefully specifying in advance the impact on the purchase price of all events that 
might occur during the earnout period, substantially reduces the incentives and opportunity for the 
parties to behave strategically.”).  
379. See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 276, at 935–37 (discussing proposed timing of release of 
purchase-price in bankruptcy sales). 
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should keep it or return it to the purchaser, or how (if retained by the 
estate) it should be distributed. Earnouts are not perfect—parties fight 
about their implementation—but may be better simply because they 
typically involve well-understood post-closing processes that answer 
some of these questions. They are a familiar, process-based response to a 
distributive problem that would improve predictability and, perhaps, 
market participation in Chapter 11 sales. 
As with DIP loans, senior creditors’ power to control the timing of 
sales should also be limited. Courts should be sensitive to the 
participatory and predictive effects that credit bidding may have on 
participation in the bidding process. In cases where credit-bidding 
appears to deter participation, courts may now conclude that there is 
cause to limit or condition the credit bid. Similarly, where the senior 
creditor is the purchaser, it should not be permitted to control the 
distribution of proceeds, as happened in LifeCare. To do so threatens the 
predictability and integrity of the process because it invites collusion and 
unequal treatment. 
CONCLUSION 
Jevic is rightly viewed as the Supreme Court’s most important 
opinion on corporate reorganization in many years. Unlike some of the 
Court’s opinions on bankruptcy,380 there is little doubt that Jevic got it 
right. It is a concise holding, narrowly crafted to address one overt 
problem—what is the right priority rule?—but in the process providing 
important guidance on the operation of a system that has managed 
trillions of dollars in claims and affected hundreds of thousands of jobs 
and potentially millions of lives. 
It also took an important theoretical position. Behind the priority 
debates is a question about the efficiency of different priority rules. As 
explained above, these debates have largely failed to account for the 
procedural implications of the rule choices, or the power that senior 
creditors can gain using their priority. Constraining this power will not 
be costless. Indeed, process values generally may add cost to Chapter 11 
reorganization. But this may simply mean that welfare maximization is 
not the only or most important value in reorganization.381 It is one of 
                                                     
380. See, e.g., Lipson & Vandermeuse, supra note 33, at 1186 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Stern v. Marshall). 
381. This was a point Justice Kagan seemed to recognize at the Jevic oral argument: 
[H]ere’s two different kinds of bankruptcy schemes. One scheme just says every time you 
distribute assets, you have to follow the following order: one, two, three, four, five. . . . That’s 
one Bankruptcy Code. Here’s another Bankruptcy Code: It says presumptively, you have to 
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several important values. So long as debtors and creditors wish to use 
bankruptcy courts to resolve financial distress, the quality of the process 
by which they do so will matter, even as it may not be free. 
The great bulk of scholarship on corporate reorganization focuses on 
distributive questions: which rules will maximize welfare by producing 
the greatest return for the largest number of stakeholders? While this is 
an appropriate ultimate question, our thinking about it too frequently 
ignores the procedural operation and implications of these rules. Jevic 
reveals that we should not ignore the quality of the process by which we 
reorganize troubled companies. The secret life of priority is process. 
POSTSCRIPT 
 As this Article went to press, the Bankruptcy Court in Jevic granted 
the drivers’ motion to convert the Chapter 11 case to a case under 
Chapter 7.382 On remand from the Supreme Court, the Bankruptcy Court 
had sought to have the parties mediate a new settlement, but this 
failed.383 Thus, nearly six years after the problematic structured 
dismissal was initially approved, and ten years after the debtors went 
into bankruptcy, the cases will be resolved by a Chapter 7 trustee. 
                                                     
follow one, two, three, four, five, but if there is a Pareto-superior solution, in other words, a 
solution in which some people are made [better] off and nobody . . . gets a worse 
outcome . . . if there is such a solution, you can go with that. And that might be a completely 
sensible bankruptcy provision . . . . The question is whether Congress did enact it and what 
[respondents] can point to in the Bankruptcy Code that suggests that the continual statement 
that it’s just one, two, three, four, five is subject to a kind of equitable exception for Pareto-
superior outcomes. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 43–44, Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 
973 (2016) (No. 15-649), 2016 WL 7117910, at *43–44. 
382. See Oral Ruling, In re Jevic Holding Corp., No. 08-01106 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. May 21, 
2018). 
383. Id. 
